

HOUSING HOUSING





The Wasting of Chicago

The Elephant and the Day of the Pygmies

Abandoning the Bulldozer Approach

The St. Louis Experience

No Room for the Poor

Rent Strike Leads to Tenant Participation in Management

The East-West Gateway Plan

Will St. Louis Adopt
A Meaningful
Regional Housing Plan?

OUT OF FOCUS

(Readers are invited to submit items for publication, indicating whether the sender can be identified. Items must be fully documented and not require any comment.) "The check (for membership) we are asking you to write could be used again you. On July 1, 1972, every bank in the United States began photostating and storing copies of every check you write. The purpose of this new federal policy is to enable government agencies to trace your financial dealings — and the many private things they reveal about you — without your knowledge or permission, and without even a subpoena. An individual's banking transactions are a mirror to his life, especially his political life. The revelations over the last few years — the Army, police, F.B.I., and congressional dossiers on political activists — suggest that fears that bank records will become a tool of political surveillance are quite real...."

In the issue before the November election, *The Grass Roots Digest* reprinted six editorial reports of partisan concern: five anti-McGovern items and one pro-Nixon piece. The Digest is published by the School of Journalism, University of Missouri at Columbia.

A photo exhibit of the Nazi program which exterminated six million Jews, was on display in St. Louis for about a week in late January and early February. During the visit, an official of the German Consulate in St. Louis questioned sponsors of the Holocaust exhibit about the appropriateness of the display at a time when Germans try to forget the past. If the official would have visited the exhibit, he would have read the following saying by Baal Shem Tov, "Forgetfulness leads to exile, while remembrance is the secret of redemption."

Berean Baptist Church in South Freeport, Illinois — which advertises itself as "independent," "fundamental" and "soul winning" — recently staged a "Mission Impossible" Sunday; "free G-man pop pistols" were distributed to all the boys and girls in attendance.

The Christian Century

The Alice-in-Wonderland circus which distinguishes the Watergate bugging affair, brought forth a legal theory which could have been used by every civil rights lawyer involved in cases of civil disobedience. Gerald Alch, representing James W. McCord, former security chief for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, proclaimed, "If one is under a reasonable apprehension, regardless of whether that apprehension is in fact correct, he is justified in breaking a law to avoid the greater harm. . . ." U.S. Attorneys, please note!

Employment lists given by Transit Services Corp., which operates busses in the St. Louis metropolitan area, to an Illinois House committee investigating racial discrimination listed the names of many black employes more than once. One black worker was listed four times, reported the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. A company spokesman explained: "To show that we weren't trying to hide anything we gave each time a person was employed." He agreed that his explanation did not justify counting a person more than once.

Just about the time when President Nixon ordered the resumption of massive bombing of North Vietnam, the U.S. Postal Service revealed the design of a new commemorative stamp based upon the theme of "Love." The red, blue, and green stamp is not intended to be a "Valentine" stamp or a "love" stamp as such, announced the Postal Service. Rather, "it is designed for the many other special occasions . . . when special sentiments are being sent to someone special."



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Editor and Publisher/Charles L. Klotzer Poetry Editor/Donald Finkel Art Editor/Mark M. Perlberg Art Director/Peter Geist

EDITORIAL CONTRIBUTORS

(Editorial Contributors are not responsible for the editorial policy of FOCUS/Midwest.) Irving Achtenberg, Douglas B. Anderson, Irl B. Baris, Harry Barnard, Eugene L. Baum, Lucille H. Bluford, H. T. Blumenthal, Leo Bohanon, Eugene Buder, Harry J. Cargas, David B. Carpenter, David L. Colton, Leon M. Despres, Pierre de Vise, Irving Dilliard, Russell C. Doll, J. W. Downey, Robert Farnsworth, James L. C. Ford, Jules B. Gerard, Elmer Gertz, David M. Grant, Leonard Hall, Harold Hartogensis, Robert J. Havighurst, James Hitchcock, John Kearney, Jack A. Kirkland, Herman Kogan, Sidney Lawrence, William B. Lloyd, Jr., Curtis D. MacDougall, Frank McCallister, J. Norman McDonough, Ralph Mansfield, Martin E. Marty, Abner J. Mikva, Florence Moog, Harry T. Moore, Henry Orland, Constance Osgood, Alexander Polikoff, Denison Ray, James D. H. Reefer, Don Rose, Anthony Scariano, Sherwin A. Swartz, John M. Swomley, Jr., Tyler Thompson, Perry Weed, Park J. White.

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AN UNNECESSARY LONG PAPER ON PUBLIC HOUSING?

F/M: I am unhappy to see that you devoted so much of your last issue to a really unnecessarily long paper on CHA which added little and left a few gross misconceptions. This is despite the fact that the article suggested that General Kean was a mild villain, Charley Swibel less than a good guy, and gave a few good quotes to Elizabeth Wood.

Nevertheless, Baron says that Elizabeth Wood was primarily concerned with gardens; yet he quotes from at least one of her great speeches in which she shows herself, as her actions did for 17 years, to be a tireless fighter for Black rights in a way that Baron, who worked for the Urban League, should certainly have recognized. No one familiar with the Chicago scene, except Banfield of Harvard, would deny that Elizabeth Wood knew that the heart of the problem was racism, and that sensitivity had to be exercised in achieving a public housing program of magnitude that was at the same time non-discriminatory.

Baron was not around during the fights for Wentworth Gardens, for integrating Sauganash, and several other veteran's projects, for the fights over Addams, etc. He does not know that these were bitter struggles between staff and commissioners, with commissioners winning sometimes and staff winning sometimes. But the battle lines were clear. Staff was on the side of integration - intelligent integration. It was recognized even at the very beginning that if too many Blacks went into a project in an all, or partially, White neighborhood, as happened at Wentworth, and subsequently at Leclaire, the whole project went. Baron doesn't seem to see this.

More important, he says Wood wanted big projects. This is far more wrong than right. Elizabeth Wood recognized that putting big or small projects in a ghetto would just be to submerge them in a larger slum, unless the whole slum were to be cleared. Good families will not move in. If we have to build while clearing slums, large projects are the best, but they must be integrated – racially, socially, economically; and apartment sizes cannot be too big. Likewise, projects must be diversified. Wood recognized this. Note Prairie Courts in Chicago.

Outside the slums, projects can be relatively small. Witness Leclaire Courts – 300 units originally; and witness the other "relocation" (city-state financed) projects such as Ogden – all in Elizabeth Wood's period.

Basically, the problem that Baron has is that he doesn't recognize that before 1953 there was a real campaign of fighting for good public housing. Even though Baron's "Big Boys" were ready to let the program go down the drain, there was among the staff a belief in public housing, and there was a belief in people.

Afterward, because of racism, but more because of mediocrity, rank stupidity, and timidity (a desire not to rock the boat), the public housing program was sold down the river.

Articles in your magazine in earlier issues have illustrated this. Incidentally, three City Club of Chicago reports were made on the CHA from 1968 to 1970 to 1972. They were detailed reports. To have Mr. Baron, who knew of their existence, ignore them is positively amazing in the light of his supposed thorough research. Any one of them in short form disposed of the points Mr. Baron took 25 pages to handle.

Sorry I couldn't be more complimentary.

J. S. Fuerst

Assistant Director

Urhan Studies

Loyola University, Chicago

Comment:

I am very reluctant to reply to Jim Fuerst's letter. Whenever Fuerst writes about the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), which is frequently, he keeps on wanting to do a Western melodrama about the time when he and other New Deal oriented people were on the staff of CHA years ago. These Westerns repeatedly por him and his colleagues as the good guys in white hats who should have, but unfortunately did not, ride off into the sunset at the end of the picture.

My essay on "Building Babylon" (FOCUS/Midwest Vol. 8, No. 56) went to great length to demonstrate how and why the CHA under Fuerst's boss, Elizabeth Wood, did not (and given the historical circumstances, most likely could not) in any lasting way run counter to the mainstream of development of racist institutions in modern urban America. By the way, no other important governmental institution was able to go against this tide either. At the same time, the essay makes clear that Wood's administration was distinguished by a great deal of personal integrity and courage.

My concern about writing on racism is to detail the operation of institutional dynamics, not personal ones, within their broad historical perspectives. I consider this as an important preliminary step for the development of new, effective strategies in the coming period. A melodramatic retelling of the story of past failures, albeit well intentiored ones, will not accomplish this task. By the way, I could recount a few such Westerns in which I have been involved, but the dead bury the dead.

Of course, I read the reports which were basically written by Jim Fuerst for the City Club. I weighed them on their merits along with several hundred other documents.

Harold M. Baron Evanston, Illinois

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Anti-Abortionists Join In a Smear Campaign

One of Illinois's ablest legislators nearly found himself dumped from his seat in the General Assembly last November by an unsavory alliance of Machine Democrats and the state's anti-abortion lobby.

Rep. Leland Rayson, a liberal Democrat from south suburban Cook County, has sponsored progressive legislation in a variety of fields, including abortion reform, since he was first elected to the General Assembly as a blue-ribbon candidate in the 1964 at-large House election. He has received four "Best Legislator" awards from the Independent Voters of Illinois, and is a member of the national board of directors of Americans for Democratic Action.

A man of Rayson's imagination and independent judgment is the last thing the Democratic bosses want in Springfield, and they've been attempting to retire him for years. In 1968, their candidate was an eversmiling young banker named Richard F. Kelly, Jr. Rayson beat him out for the single safe Democratic seat in the heavily Republican Ninth district.

Last spring the Ninth district regulars slated Kelly again. But this time they had powerful allies. Rayson's sponsorship of two unsuccessful abortion-reform bills made him the leading Illinois target of "Illinois Citizens Concerned for Life," the political arm of the anti-abortion "Right to Life" lobby. Kelly's precinct captains flooded the district with brochures containing garish photographs of aborted fetuses, undocumented assertions of the medical dangers of abortion, and crudely drawn cartoon flyers describing Rayson as "the Father of Abortion" and an advocate of "euthanasia of elderly and mentally-handicapped persons."

Kelly's smear campaign was successful — up to a point. He finished about 1,500 votes ahead of Rayson to win a seat in the General Assembly. Due to the intense interest generated by the Democratic feud, and the vagaries of the cumulative voting system in effect in Illinois House elections, which permitted liberal Democrats to cast three votes for him, Rayson managed to hold on to his own seat by upsetting Lynn Branne, a colorless Republican incumbent, by about 1,000 votes. (Republican newcomer William F. Mahar led the field by over 10,000 votes.)

A few weeks after the election, an uncharacteristically angry Rayson fired off a complaint to the National Fair Campaign Practices committee. Kelly professed amazement that Rayson would file charges against a fellow Democrat. "Maybe he's senile," he told a newspaper reporter.

Arbitrary Zoning Target of Black Jack Suits; Outcome Will Determine Pattern of U.S. Housing

The U.S. Department of Justice, the United Methodist Church, the Interreligious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc., and the American Civil Liberties Union have gone to court to upset racially motivated, arbitrary zoning in the City of Black Jack, Missouri. Suits are now pending in Judge James Meredith's and Judge Roy Harper's courts. The cases have attracted national attention — even the White House had to take note. It can be assumed that no matter who wins the cases, the decisions will be appealed.

Racially and economically integrated housing is the issue. If every little group of citizens can incorporate in order to rezone its area and keep out other citizens they fear, it would premote social disruption and subvert those pioneering ventures — isolated and pitifully few in number — still hoping to build bridges between our black and white citizens.

The sponsors of the Park View Heights housing project have invested nearly \$300,000 in plans, the ground, and expenses such as taxes, interest, carrying charges, insurance, and so forth.

Every postponement of the decision works against the plaintiffs. Their chances of survival are impaired by every dollar spent unrelated to the project itself. Judge Harper's hostility to the project is well known. Originally, he dismissed the suit on technical grounds, throwing out four of the five claims brought by the developer, leaving only the claim that the zoning ordinance resulted in drastic devaluation of the project site. This order was reversed by the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals and he was ordered to set a trial date immediately.

So far Judge Harper has failed to set a date. Such delaying tactics are a prime example of the misuse of the judicial process by a judge. Most likely the trial will not come up before summer.

When the project was announced more than three years ago, there was hope and a sense of expectancy. Today there is cynicism. The cause of this mood of failure can partially be found in the national political scene as well as in the attitude of the noble citizens of Black Jack. Just as crucial, however, are the delaying tactics of Judge Harper. It is not always the judicial system, but more often Judges such as he who must bear responsibility for the low esteem in which the rule of law is held. Non-judges would be held in contempt for similar behavior; all a Judge Harper can expect is a reversal by a higher court. What, indeed, are the facts of the Black Jack case?

In late 1969, a group of religious organizations placed an option on twelve acres in an unincorporated area of North St. Louis County. They chose the site because it was zoned properly (multi-family, apartment-dwelling), and was in the area of highest growth and employment in the county. The sponsors, the first to propose a subsidized apartment project in St. Louis County, consisted of the Interreligious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc. (ICUA) and the Park View Heights Corporation (PHC) (representing three Methodist church groups: St. Mark's [four miles from the site], United Methodist Metro Ministry, and the Office of the Missouri Bishop of the UMC). The ICUA collected all funds and provided the professional consultants.

The sponsors developed plans to construct and operate a 210-unit, racially integrated, middle-income townhouse-apartment complex to be named Park View Heights. They provided for all the amenities of modern living: central airconditioning, balconies, patios and split-level construction. While privately owned, lower rents were made possible by government subsidies of interest rates (\$119 for one-bedroom to \$257 for four-bedroom apartments).

When the building plans were announced in March 1970, two dormant neighborhood groups, The Black Jack and the Spanish Lake Improvement Associations, publicized their opposition. They initiated – in vain – a massive letter writing campaign to Congressional and U.S. government leaders. Nevertheless, in June 1970,

the Federal government issued a "Feasibility" letter approving the project.

Within two weeks of this approval, citizens in the area circulated petitions to incorporate a new city around the project site. When the required signatures were obtained, the County Council (with only one opposing vote) granted a Charter to the new City of Black Jack on August 6.

Immediately, the ICUA and PHC filed suit in state court to keep the city from functioning. The court dismissed this request. As expected, one of the first acts of the new city government was to rezone to single-family.

In January 1971, the sponsors were joined by the American Civil Liberties Union in filing a federal suit demanding that the court reinstate multi-family zoning, allow the project to be built, and claiming that the sole purpose and effect of rezoning was to exclude racial minorities. Then three-tenth of one percent were non-white. Today, just over one percent is non-white.

Recognizing the national significance of the issues involved, former Secretary of Housing Romney pressured the U.S. Department of Justice to file a racial discrimination suit. Initially hesitant, President Nixon finally approved a suit.

Both cases are now pending. In view of the probable appeals, it will take another one to two years before the final verdict is handed down.

Meanwhile, a community which could have become a byword for its enlightened and democratic policies, must now live with the knowledge that it is known throughout the country as racist and clannish, representing the worst of suburbia.

Two Young Governors Offer Some Surprises

A degree of excitement and surprise has been added to state politics in Missouri and Illinois. Both states have new governors, young and enterprising, who come from opposite ends of the political spectrum but have performed well in the initial months of their office.

Gov. Dan Walker started out as a maverick. After an election campaign which showed some regrettable weak spots – such as his comments on gun control and taxes – he came through with excellent appointments.

The liberal "outs," such as Anthony Scariano and Abner Mikva, were appointed to crucial posts. Many other appointments were of equal caliber.

In a way, though, Gov. Walker was expected to make good appointments. In Missouri, however, Gov. Bond was expected to appoint archconservatives and silk-stocking Republicans salted with a few bootheel Democrats and camouflaged Birchers.

As it turns out, Republican Gov. Bond is the first Missouri Governor to appoint a black to preside over the St. Louis police board. Former Senator T. D. McNeal has an opportunity to auger in a new chapter in police-community relations. Gov. Bond took the executive of the Missouri Association of Social Welfare and made him the head of the Department of Welfare, a Cinderella story for all MASW members. Many other appointments were equally surprising.

His legislative proposals and later public statements reflected a moderate approach to government except for his endorsement of capital punishment. As a whole, they certainly did not agree with his pre-election image of a right winger. We may not go as far as William Douthit, executive director of the St. Louis Urban League, who proclaimed "this guy is for real," but we are encouraged and look forward with some hope that Missouri may yet catch up with the twentieth century.

We can only endorse the Governor's proposals to require open meetings of all government agencies, to abolish the patronage-ridden auto license fee offices, to establish a merit system for all employees, to tighten up control over campaign expenditures, and to pass the equal rights amendment for women. His program in education, mass transit, tax relief for the elderly, among others, is similar to recommendations by the Democratic-controlled legislature, according to Fred W. Lindecke of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Indeed, he surprised many when he recommended legislation giving teachers the right to strike during the current teachers' strike in St. Louis.

Gov. Bond was either a very misunderstood man, at least by the liberal community, or he is a most astute politician with grand ambitions. We favor the latter view.

Hearnest Out to Get Eagleton?

Of course, former Gov. Warren E. Hearnes has no intention of forsaking political life. If anyone had any doubts, they should have been stilled by the battle royal about the composition of the executive committee of the Democratic Party of Missouri.

Hearnes wanted to retain the three-man committee. Senators Thomas Eagleton and Stuart Symington favored a five-man committee. The additional appointment of two new members would dilute Hearnes' influence. When, indeed, the state committee adopted the five-man committee, Hearnes was fuming. At this point Hearnes is so turned off by Eagleton that he may even consider opposing Eagleton for the Senate seat, in spite of Sen. Eagleton's current popularity in the state.

We shall wait and see.


Challenge Hawkish "Public Service" Film

"Only the Strong," a 30-minute hawkish film by the American Security Council and the Institute for American Strategy, had been peddled to many television stations as a "public service" feature as reported earlier (Vol. 9, No. 57). When it was challenged by a coalition of disarmament and peace groups, the head of both the ASC and IAS, John Fisher, came back with an eleven-page letter to broadcasters alleging that the film is accurate as to U.S. inferiority in the arms race and that the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission does not apply because broadcasters have not been giving enough time to the military point of view!

Nothing was mentioned in his letter about the hundreds of thousands of Fisher mailings which urged people to vote against Senate doves.

Cairo Revisited

The findings of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights confirmed what has been stated repeatedly, including FOCUS/Midwest (V. 8, No. 54), that the state of Illinois should take over law enforcement in Cairo, Ill. With his popularity quite high, now might be the time to act for Gov. Daniel Walker.



The poor, the black, and the unemployed continue to gravitate to Chicago. Chicago remains home for 64 percent of the metropolitan area unemployed, 75 percent of families below the poverty level, 76 percent of the Spanish-speaking, 85 percent of the welfare recipients, and 90 percent of the blacks.

At the other end of the social scale, Chicago contains but 29 percent of all metropolitan area families earning over \$25,000 a year, 29 percent of the college graduates, 26 percent of the corporation executives, and 25 percent of the white public school children. A comparison of the 1960 and 1970 Census reveals that during the 1960 decade Chicago lost half a million whites and gained a third of a million blacks; lost 220 factories, 760 stores, and 229,000 jobs but gained 90,000 welfare recipients; lost 140,000 private housing units but gained 19,000 public housing units. The losses represent drains of 12 percent of the housing, 14 percent of the jobs, 17 percent of the stores, and 18 percent of the whites in terms of 1960 assets.

Chicago's losses have been the suburbs' gains. In these ten years, the suburbs gained 800,000 whites, 350,000 housing units, and 500,000 jobs. These trends go back to the 1950's, but they were much

stronger in the last ten years. In 1950, 66 of every 100 metropolitan area residents lived in Chicago and 78 of every 100 jobs were located in Chicago. By 1960, the city's share of metropolitan population and jobs had slipped to 57 and 68 percent, respectively. As of 1970, Chicago accounted for but 48 percent of the metropolitan population and 52 percent of the jobs.

How has this massive exodus of people, jobs, and homes affected the sending areas in the city and the receiving areas in the suburbs? Has suburbanization proceeded too fast? Have all classes of people and property benefited from the process? How have the housing and real estate industries responded to these trends? And what do these trends portend for the future of metropolitan Chicago?

Family Income vs. Higher Costs

First, let us consider the adjustments of family income to higher costs of housing and transportation in the suburbs. More metropolitan area families own their homes – 53 percent in 1970 versus 51 percent in 1960. Two-car ownership has doubled – from 300,000 to 600,000 families. Average home value has gone up \$100 since 1960, from \$24,200 to \$24,300. Average monthly rent increased 12 percent, from \$104 to \$116. Average family income grew by 24 percent, from \$9,560 to \$11,840 (all dollar figures are expressed in constant 1970 values). A greater proportion of women (45 versus 39 percent) and boys (41 versus 39 percent) but a smaller proportion of older persons (28 versus 35 percent) are now in the labor force.

Because the new homes and work places are more dispersed and are less accessible by public transportation, the average work trip is longer -6 versus 5 miles one way and automobile commuters have increased by one-third. A majority of Chicago residents now drive to work (53% in 1970; up from 45% in 1960), while the overwhelming majority of suburbanites now commute by car (80% now; up from 69% in 1960 in the case of Du Page residents).

The corresponding decline in commuting by public transportation saw the proportion of commuters going by bus fall from 19 to 14 percent (from 30 to 20 percent for Chicago residents), and that of railroad and subway commuters slide from 12 to 9 percent (from 13 to 10 percent for Chicago residents). Thus, the suburbanization of jobs has considerably aggravated the congestion of expressways and surface roads while contributing to the under-utilization of financially hard-pressed CTA and suburban bus and railroad companies.

The massive suburbanization of jobs has meant that fewer suburbanites now work in Chicago and that more Chicagoans work in the suburbs. Chicago, with 52 percent of the metropolitan jobs and 48 percent of the labor force, still has 8 percent more jobs than workers — but, of course, the city's jobs do not perfectly match the skills of its labor force, nor do the suburbs' jobs match the labor force. Suburban Cook County, which added 340,000 new jobs during the decade, has supplanted Chicago as the area's major importer of workers. With 29 percent of the metropolitan area's jobs and only 17 percent of its labor force, suburban Cook County now has 70 percent more jobs than local workers.

As a result of the shift of Chicago's industrial gravity center to suburban Cook County, there are more than twice as many reverse commuters from Chicago as in 1960: 18 percent of Chicago's labor force now works in the suburbs, compared to seven percent ten years ago.

Correspondingly, suburban residents now rely less on Chicago work places and more on local industry. For example, only 36 percent of Park Forest's labor force now works in Chicago, compared with 56 percent in 1960, the bulk of the remaining labor force working in South Cook

County. The proportion of Du Page County's labor force working in Chicago fell from 37 to 23 percent, with percent now working in the county, compared with 42 percent in 1960.

Only in America: Central Cities for Poor

So interrelated and complex are the suburban shifts of people, jobs and stores, and the construction of new housing and expressways that it is difficult to separate cause-and-effect relations among these. Do jobs follow people to the suburbs or vice-versa? Is the demand for housing in the suburbs the cause of suburban housing construction or does the supply of the latter create the demand? The same may be asked about expressways. New regional shopping centers are perhaps the most clearly dependent on existing consumer demand. Yet even they constitute magnets that have a multiplying effect on the demand for urban land within their service area.

Then there is the push-pull vector of forces -- how suburbanization is affected by a combination of the repellent aspects of inner city life and of the attractive aspects of suburban life. North American cities are unique among the world's cities in having poor people living in the central city and rich people living in suburbs. In fact major urban strategies since World War II in Britain and France aim at inducing people and industry to move to the suburbs, an effort that so far has met little success.

A team of British anthropologists accompanied by a crew from the BBC recently spent a month in Chicago's suburbs to find out what incentives we use to get people and industry to move from the city to the suburbs. They found out that we used two secret weapons.

In the central city, whites fear blacks and flee in terror,

The rapacity of developers feeding on the still-warm bodies in Chicago's dying inner city communities suggests a parallel with the feeding habits of vultures. But we resist making such an analogy because it would be unfair to vultures. At least they wait until the bodies get cold.

and in the suburbs we have private developers who build twice as much housing as we need to shelter refugees from the embattled city.

The housing industry responded to the challenge of Chicago's loss of half a million whites and gain of 300,000 blacks by building 110,000 new housing units, most of them on Chicago's white north side. Since Chicago had a net population loss of 200,000 people, it could not possibly use this massive infusion of new housing. Something had to give. What gave were the city's older black ghettos which contributed the bulk of the 140,000 units that were vacated, abandoned, and demolished during the decade. This housing was vacated by blacks drawn to the more attractive housing of racially changing areas emptied by whites who were attracted by the new housing proliferating on Chicago's white north side and the suburbs.

Even more housing was built in the suburbs: 344,000 units during the decade. Housing developers in the suburbs catered not only to the families with school-age children,

accommodate the latter, there was a four-fold increase in suburban apartment construction since 1960 – from 7,000 to 28,000 apartments a year. The two benchmarks in this trend are 1961, the first year that more apartments were built in the suburbs than in the city, and 1969, when more apartments than houses were built in the suburbs.

The future of the metropolitan area depends on the future of Chicago. The future of Chicago depends on the future of the southeast side. The future of the south side depends on the public accountability of the housing and real estate industry. From our present perspective, that is a grim prospect.

Altogether, developers put up 454,000 houses and apartments during the 1960's. This represents an increase of 23 percent in the metropolitan area's housing, or twice the 11.5 percent gain in population.

Chicago is paying for this prodigal housing construction with a current vacancy rate of five percent, and the abandonment and demolition of 15,000 housing units a year. A decade of overbuilding in the city and suburbs has left seven square miles of devastation on Chicago's west and south sides. Nor is housing construction slackening in the face of this catastrophic evidence of a housing surplus. The housing industry established record construction levels in four of the last five years. Last year's record of 63,000 new units was 50 percent above the high levels of ten years ago (43,000 units).

The rapacity of developers feeding on the still-warm bodies in Chicago's dying inner city communities suggests a parallel with the feeding habits of vultures. But we resist making such an analogy because it would be unfair to vultures. At least they wait until the bodies get cold. And they cannot fly off to other feeding grounds until a few hours after gorging themselves.

The only restraint shown by suburban developers is that they do not build for Chicago's blacks. Except for a handful of ghetto developments in South Cook County, blacks remain shut out of suburban housing. The increasing separation between suburban work places and Chicago's black ghettos creates a shortage of workers in the former and excessive unemployment in the latter. Unemployment rates are between one and two percent in Northwest Cook and Du Page counties and between 6 and 14 percent in Chicago's black ghettos. As it is, 40,000 black workers make the daily trek from Chicago to the suburbs, and many more would join them if they had a car.

The Role of the Real Estate Industry

The real estate industry bears additional responsibility for the despoliation of black ghettos on Chicago's west and south sides. The inner city's blacks pay much more rent than whites or Spanish-speaking people occupying similar housing. These black communities suffered the loss of a fourth of their housing in the 1960's, while similar inner

city white and Spanish-speaking neighborhoods lost only five percent of their housing. Excessive property taxes based on discriminatory assessed valuations are a major factor in both instances. The Cook County Assessor's valuation of property in Woodlawn, for example, is above actual market value, while in similar-aged housing construction on the north side, his valuation is about a fourth of the market value. Property taxes account for about 40 percent of gross rental income in Woodlawn and only 15 percent of income on the north side.

Property tax discrimination is not intentional, based as it is on the brick-and-mortar basis of assessing valuation. But identical packages of brick-and-mortar are worth four times more on the north side than in Woodlawn, wherein lies the discriminatory effect.

The suspicion already exists in the minds of many that the government is taxing ghetto properties at confiscatory levels to clear and acquire the land without compensation to the owner, since urban renewal is no longer feasible. There is no better way for government to give the lie to this suspicion than by revising its assessment methods to conform to statutory requirements that ratios of assessed to market valuations be equalized. Since the real estate industry is best equipped to document this discrimination, and since property-owner and manager members in the black ghetto are victimized thereby, it should take the leadership in vigorously advocating this much-needed reform.

The Final Stage - Abandoned Housing

In stressing the primary responsibility of excessive housing construction in the outer city and suburbs, and of discriminatory taxation for the epidemic of housing abandonment in the black ghetto, it is not to minimize the importance of the self-destructive tendencies of tenants who are the final occupants of dying buildings. Housing abandonment is the ultimate stage of the collapsed housing markets of older black ghettos. At this stage, normal black households have moved to the plentiful vacancies of racially changing communities vacated by whites attracted by the even more plentiful new housing in outlying white communities. The only tenants that landlords can attract at this stage are the most destitute and least competent, many of whom are destructive and pathological. Rents are lowered, maintenance costs rise, and vacancies are quickly vandalized. In time all tenants leave because the buildings become too dangerous for even the most desperate. The empty buildings are soon wrecked or burned down by the neighborhood vandals.

Most of Chicago's ghettos that have been predominantly black for over 30 years contain neighborhoods that have reached this final stage. Communities like Kenwood-Oakland and Woodlawn have lost over a third of their housing since 1960, and currently have vacancy rates of 15 to 20 percent as part of this process.

The government apparently holds demolition and tax liens on the thousands of parcels so far cleared in this fashion. There seems to be no market and no buyers for this land. Very likely the land could not be given away in the present atmosphere of uncertainty over the future of the south east side.

The future of the metropolitan area depends on the future of Chicago. The future of Chicago depends on the future of the south east side. The future of the south side depends on the public accountability of the housing and real estate industry. From our present perspective, that is a grim prospect.

Pierre de Vise, project director of the Chicago Regional Hospital Study, is a frequent contributor to FOCUS/Midwest.



The forest pygmies live out of the mainstream of village life. They are considered by the people of the village to be odd, a bother and superfluous. Yet in truth the village depends for its existence on the pygmies, for the pygmies in many ways are the main support of the village. If the pygmies disappear or are forced from their way of life, it would destroy the village.

Coin Trumbull,

The Forest People and Wayward Servants.



The Elephant and the Day of the Pygmies

RUSSELL C. DOLL

(This is a description of a zoning hearing. It was reconstructed by the author who was present at the hearing. He probed his own memory and that of others. In doing research on the article the author was told that the City Planning Department had, unfortunately, either "lost" the tape of this meeting or had a "broken" machine doing the recording.)

On April 1, 1971, a bitingly cold and raw day in Kansas City, Missouri, a bus loaded with people from the Valentine Neighborhood Association pulled up to the steps of City Hall. Fighting a blustery wind, they pushed their way through revolving doors and then joined their neighbors in the large City Council room.

On this day, the City Planning Commission would hold hearings to decide whether or not the Valentine neighborhood was to be condemned as a "slum," thus opening the way for its "redevelopment" by the Penn Valley Redevelopment Corporation. The corporation wanted to acquire the right of eminent domain over this area, an area they regarded as superfluous. Its inhabitants were now a bother and certainly out of the mainstream of the larger city patterns and out of the mainstream of city progress as defined by the Redevelopment plans.

The Penn Valley Redevelopment Corporation was the brainchild of the Broadway Area Association, which included Panhandle Eastern Pipeline, the Business Men's Assurance Company, the national headquarters of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Kansas City Life Insurance Company. Leading the movement for the project was Kansas City Life.

The insurance company is housed in an imposing and massive elephant gray, stone building. It is set back from the bustle of Broadway Avenue, being fronted by an expanse of well manicured lawn. Guarding the street entrance, two large stone lions lie on massive pedestals and stare impassively ahead. The many-windowed building seems to hold a hundred-eyed watch over the area. It sits like the

medieval watchtowers from which kings surveyed their domains.

What those inside the gray leviathan look out upon is an old, stable area of the city. Many of the residents are second or third generation. The area is composed predominantly of blue collar workers or members of the burgeoning class of white collar workers of moderate incomes. There are a handful of upper middle class people in professional positions. This group has moved into the area over the last ten years, attracted by the low taxes, reasonable prices for good older homes, and the proximity to convenient shopping centers and downtown.

Cohesive and Stable

The area has served for years as a good place to raise children near the central city, and has served as a "staging area" for social mobility. The homes are old and the majority are well kept. The crime rate is one of the lowest in the city. It is a "naturally" cohesive and stable area, the kind of area farsighted city planners and urbanologists are fighting tooth and nail to maintain elsewhere or to create through the concept of "New Towns in Cities." It is a place for what the larger society would call the "little man." It is the kind of area which must be preserved if people of low, moderate, and middle incomes are to find a good place to live.

The development plan would have built 428 apartment units and 1,080,000 square feet of commercial office space, served by 4,211 offstreet parking spaces. Building was to be completed in seven phases commencing in 1972 and ending in 1983. Planning for the development had begun as far back as 1967 behind closed doors. It was not until May 16, 1968, three months after official notice to the city, that the residents discovered the plans for their futures.

Mary Hodges, a resident of the area and a person responsible for organizing opposition to the plan, stated:

I picked up the evening paper and there is was: a glowing

cory about what a favor they were doing for us to take this ea. I called up Larry Downs (President of the Westport Community Council) and Paul Edwards (Past President of the Council and an urban specialist who lived in the area). We decided that this was definitely an attempt to instigate a very profitable venture at the expense of the neighborhood. We immediately decided to do something about it.

Miss Hodges then called a meeting of interested people. It was held in Hodges' living room and the decision was made to fight for the area. Paul Edwards says:

We were appalled that anyone could be so short-sighted as to not realize the value to the city of maintaining stable areas where all races and income levels live together. It seemed to us that buildings and businesses were taking precedence over people. Where were the people to go? In no way would they be getting enough compensation for their homes so they could buy comparable housing in as good an area and at as reasonable prices as here. It was a cynical and heartless move.

A young couple, Paula and Bill Elias, who had purchased a home in the area because of the high quality of life for such a reasonable price, were ready to stay and fight.

We were upset because of the whole bulldozer approach. We were also concerned about the long range affect of this. If they could do this to our area they could do it to others in the city. This is a good area. We want our kids to go to Norman School and so do most of the parents here. The parents know the teachers and the teachers know the children. Many teachers have taught for years here and are like grandmothers to the children. We love this area even though it's not considered by some to be an area of highly sophisticated people. It's a friendly, comfortable area.

But to Kansas City Life and other planners of the development the area was a "slum" to be done away with. A report from the Department of City Development to the City Planning Commission, stated:

The applicant's blight determination study was prepared by the Burns McDonnell Engineering Company. The study indicated that 77% of the residential structures have inadequate building sites or are improperly used and 50 percent of the residential structures have major structural deficiencies. Seventy-three percent of the residential structures do not conform with the building code or zoning ordinance and 53% have inadequate public facilities. An independent sample survey conducted by the city verified the existence of some blight in the study area, however, not to the extent of that measured by the applicant.

Mary Hodges, Paula and Bill Elias, Paul Edwards, and the 250 people at the hearing were adamant that it was not a slum area. They knew some of the homes needed repair, but the area was stable, and with help from the city they felt it could remain stable. The report from the City hinted at the overzealous use of the term blighted.

Normally redevelopment should occur in the least stable neighborhoods first. Since the city contains areas where deterioration is more pronounced, it might be concluded that the proposed Penn Valley Project is "out of phase";

But then a telling statement followed:

"... however, an exception would allow it (redevelopment) to take place in areas of major economic potential if the developer can acquire property of sufficient size to be considered a significant development unit.

Paul Edwards summed up part of the problem inherent in the latter quote.

Our values and biases run in the direction of the city as a place to live. Theirs run in the direction of profits.

Profits For The "Developers"

If, then, the area could be declared blighted, profits would indeed accrue to the "developers." Under the provisions of the State Redevelopment Act, the area would fall under the law of eminent domain and the homes could be taken at bargain prices. Further, Penn Valley Redevelopment Corporation would receive 10 years of full tax abatement and 15 years of fifty percent tax abatement while being granted zoning for lucrative high rise apartment and office buildings. If the area would be declared blighted and the tax abatements authorized, then by law, county taxes would be abated as well, under the same favorable terms.

The redevelopment plans held other long range repercussions besides loss of tax dollars from businesses. The repercussions would be felt throughout other areas of the city.

A problem could exist to the south, where an office building of 20 stories will be immediately across Valentine Road from single family residential. This potential conflict could set a precedent for development further to the south... The plan, if approved, should dedicate additional right-of-way for lane widening and deceleration lanes on Southwest Trafficway... Additional right-of-way should be dedicated on 33rd Street... Pennsylvania must be improved to a 100 foot right-of-way with 20 foot building setbacks from its connection with Broadway in Penn Valley Park south and Valentine Road.

So other residential areas might go the way of the Valentine neighborhood. Even more ominous were the street widening proposals which seemed to be opening the way for a high speed, north-south trafficway through the area and into other stable city neighborhoods to the south. The trafficway, which is to end in the southern suburbs, is opposed by the City Planning Division.

The Trap

When pygmies trap elephants they use a simple method. They let the elephant just walk into a trap. As the elephant approaches, one person moves from the cover of the brush into its path. Taken by surprise, the elephant stops for a moment. At that instant another person leaps behind the elephant and cuts the tendon of one rear leg. Crippled, the elephant turns slowly, during which time another person cuts the tendons of the other rear leg. At this point, the elephant is helpless and begins to collapse. A spear is then driven upward into the vital regions of the underbelly, near the bladder – a fatal puncture.

The City Council Chamber is overcrowded with people spilling into the foyer. Area residents wear small, heart-shaped signs and carry larger ones stating, "My Heart Is In My Home." Because of the emotional issues involved, the far-reaching effect the issue would have on the rest of the city, and the publicity work done by Mary Hodges, the hearing is well attended by reporters, people from the City Development Department, and the City Council. Sitting along a wall by the long hearing table are Councilman elect Joel Pelofsky and Councilman Richard Berkley. Both have been sympathetic to the residents, but a large question mark lies in their effectiveness, with Pelofsky being a neophyte maverick recently elected to the City Council in an astounding upset, and Richard Berkley, being a veteran councilman with the reputation of being an arbitrator. Council members Sarah Snow, Sal Capra, and Harold Hammil are also present. Where their sympathies lie, no one knows. As for Capra, he is for the project.

The biggest question mark is the newly elected Mayor, Charles Wheeler, and the stand he will take on the issue. This man is the original political Mr. Magoo.

He moves blithely through all the political obstacles and pitfalls, somehow skirting the falling bricks of political issues which have crushed other politicians. He takes stands on issues, speaking his mind and making statements which would turn other politicians a deathly-white. He had pledged support to the residents during the campaign — but that was the campaign; now he has been elected. The redevelopment matter is of importance to big business. Statements have been made which imply that if the plan is not approved, the business community would see Kansas City as not too friendly a place. The Mayor is nowhere to be seen.

Star Sympathetic To Redevelopment

The area faces an uphill fight. The Kansas City Star, called by some the apologist for big business in Kansas City, is sympathetic to the Redevelopment Corporation. The City Development Department, after stating the plan's "merits" and the "adjustments," recommends that, "Following the public hearing and an initial opportunity for the Plan Commission and Council to study the project, the staff feels that serious negotiations should be undertaken with the purpose of attaining the benefits set forth above . . ." It seems as if the City Planning Commission approved the plan with conditions.

The role played by the Planning Division is still not clear. Residents, however, feel there was a clandestine involvement between the Division and the Penn Valley interests. According to a resident who played a key role,

The Development Department was meeting secretly with the Penn Valley people at the same time they were supposed to be working with us on the development of a Westport Plan. As late as fall of 1970 they (the Division) had reviewed and critiqued the plans of the redevelopment people. Imagine, all the while they were supposedly working in good faith with us on the preservation of our area they were denying the existence of any such redevelopment plan.

At some time during the cooperative planning between the Planning Division and the community an employee accidently showed the resident a copy of the redevelopment plan.

But I didn't realize what the plan was. In fact I don't think the person who showed it to me knew. That night I got a call from a person in the Division asking me not to let

anyone know what I had seen. I was told it was a matter of losing jobs if the information got out. I still didn't realism what it was because I was trusting what they were telling us, that there was no redevelopment plan. Eventually, though it did get out in some way that plans had been shown.

A highly placed person in the Planning Division disclaims any secret planning or involvement with the Penn Valley interests. He stated:


The City Development Department did not participate in the preparation of this plan nor did we review or suggest provisions secretly. The Plan was clearly explained as early as 1968 in the Kansas City Star when the redevelopment plans were discussed in terms of long range objectives of the Broadway Area Merchant's Association. This was certainly public knowledge then but was not presented as a firm proposal. In December of 1970, the plan was brought to the staff for general discussion since we were actively preparing a definitive land plan for the entire Westport Community. There was no indication at that time that they were to develop under the Missouri Redevelopment Corporation Act.

The plan seemed to have been the same as the one announced earlier, however, we gave it to our principal planners to critique in context with the larger plan we were working on with the Westport people. This is what we would have done with any plan brought in by anyone. There was no attempt at secrecy nor was there a concrete proposal for the implementation of this plan. We had plans submitted to us from other areas and all were treated equally.

It wasn't until after the first of the year that the proponents of the plan came back and talked to us again. At some point in these discussions, they indicated their desire to utilize the Missouri Redevelopment Corporation Act to implement the plan. We discussed the requirements of this act with them for compliance with both City and State laws, however, we did not see their documentation nor did we receive an application.

They filed their formal application shortly thereafter on February 2, 1970. From that time on the proposal was a matter of public record. The staff then began a very detailed investigation into the applicant's plan and required documentation to render a report to the Commission as required by City statutes.

Behind a thick wooden railing which separates them from the people sit the members of the City Planning Commission. The Commission members have been appointed by the outgoing Mayor, Ilus Davis, and are not answerable to the public. The majority are businessmen noted for a reluctance to disapprove zoning favorable to business. They sit under the Seal of the City with the words, "Let Honor, Truth and Justice Rule Within These Walls."





Charles B. Wheeler, Jr. Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri

The hearing is called to order. A representative from the Penn Valley Redevelopment Project opens the testimony. Others follow. Looking alike in clothes and mannerisms, the men from Kansas City Life, the lawyers for the Redevelopment Corporation, Bankers, and others from the Business Men's Association beat a steady path to the microphone. The expensive suits, razor-cut hair, and stylish shoes contrast sharply with the modest dress of the area residents and their lawyer, who sits waiting patiently for a chance to reply.

Filibuster?

The testimony continues and hours pass. Children have begun to play in the hall outside where Joe Shaughnessy, the new Councilman for the area, sits on a flight of stairs deep in thought over what he is to say, having made the saving of the area a key part of his city-wide campaign.

Another hour passes. The presentations for the Redevelopment Corporation are broken only by a spattering of applause and a ripple of excited talk. Mayor Wheeler comes into the room and sits down at a table behind the railing. He smiles his small boy, impish smile, nodding slightly to acknowledge the applause.

More time passes as representatives from the Corporation advance their arguments under the cover of facts and figures which are rattled off like so many statistical rounds from a battery of machine guns. Charts, maps, and diagrams are unfurled as if they were banners from an alien army. They then hang in order, like honored battle flags which have rallied troops over hostile barricades.

Some City Council members leave. Newsmen begin to drift in and out, and finally leave with only the testimony of the redevelopment representatives in their notes. Many residents who were to testify have left to return to their jobs. A cry of "filibuster" is shouted from the balcony. Other cries arise: "Give us our turn." "Enough of them — how about us?" "Filibuster, filibuster." "Let us talk."

A smile appears on the face of one of the Redevelopment representatives. Another turns around to glare at the residents. The gavel slams down and silences the cries. Promises are made by the Chairman that all sides will be heard. The hearing continues.

Out in the hall a few businessmen stand before maps pinned to a bulletin board. The maps show the neighborhood divided as to land usage and phase development under the Redevelopment Plan. Comments are made as to which are the "choice pieces." The men stand before the maps, speaking with the enthusiasm and anticipation of diners selecting pieces of a Christmas goose. They then move to the doorway of the Council Chambers as, inside, shades are pulled and a slide projector is started.

The screen shows pictures of homes in advanced stages

of deterioration. Wesley Jennings, a Planning Commission member, sits up slowly from his slouched position, his eyes now riveted on the screen. He sees sagging roofs, peeling paint, gutters broken from their holdings. In the vivid color of the slide show, trash stands out starkly on dirt where once there were lawns. Jennings leans forward making notes on a pad.

The pictures were taken in winter. There is no relief of green from the trees which stand now like corpses raising skeleton arms to a blue-black sky.

Inside the homes, plaster has broken from walls and ceilings. Doors are off of hinges. Foundations crumble. And with the crumbling foundations so seem to go the hopes of the hundreds who are fighting for their homes. Blight? Here it is. What other proof is needed? The point is made more strongly than any figure shown on a graph.

The lights come on. Jennings slumps back again into his chair, a slight smile playing on his face.

An elderly woman sits weeping silently in the back of the room. Paul Edwards, face tense, stands just inside the doorway eyes still intent on the empty screen as if in disbelief. Paula Elias, the small wisp of a woman, stands as taut as a stretched rope, twisting a handkerchief. Her husband, Bill puts a hand on her shoulder, saying something to her while tears begin to well in her eyes. Mary Hodges sits angry, looking at the residents who are starting to protest the slides.

So it seems to be over. The Penn Valley Redevelopment Corporation for Kansas City Life and the Broadway Area Association, stand in its triumphant hour. The homes will be crushed as pygmies homes get crushed when in the path of a rampaging elephant. The right of eminent domain will give the right to crush. Eminent domain and this fantastic right of territorial claim over people's property and lives—this ancient right of kings.

The room is tense, the atmosphere like elastic pulled to its limit. In the silence, Jennings leans forward again. In slow measured tones, speaking directly into his table microphone, his words resounding from the high chamber ceiling, he addresses the razor-haircut men, the elderly lady, Paul Edwards, Mary Hodges, Paula and Bill Elias, the 250 people and the man standing at the lectern — "Who owns most of those buildings we just saw?"

The Tendon

Shouts break from hundreds of throats and gather like thunder claps in the room. Cheers, whistles. One, two, five, ten, fifty people rise to their feet applauding. Jubilation! For the residents of the area know the answer to that question. They have lived with it for five years.

The gavel sounds again. The tumult starts to ebb. The man at the lectern stares at Jennings. He starts to speak. Hesitates, then answers: "Kansas City Life Insurance Company." Thunder breaks again. Jennings leans back. The gavel pounds for silence.

It is rumored that at that very moment the gray building on Broadway shook ever so slightly — as an elephant might whose tendon had been slashed.

Kansas City Life Insurance Company had, for five years, been buying homes in the area and allowing them to deteriorate. They had been sending letters to the residents hinting at redevelopment plans and implying that repairs of homes would be a waste of money. But many residents repaired their homes while Kansas City Life neglected theirs. When pictures were to be taken of the building at 3320 Pennsylvania, owned by Kansas City Life, residents noted a truck filled with debris pull up to the home. Men spilled the debris on the lawn and threw it from the windows. After the pictures were taken the truck returned and the debris was removed.

The Other Leg

The Mayor now requests time to testify. He is greeted by a tumultuous standing ovation. He starts:

It has been my experience that big business lacks the conscience of a normal human being...

In an explosion of relief as to where the Mayor stands the cheers start again and end with the gavel's hammering. Wheeler will support the residents. He continues,

This proposed project is a perfect example of a corporate effort in direct conflict with citizens of this community. I am here favoring their views.

After a few minutes of supportive statements, he addresses the Planning Commission.

I want to change the subject. As a new Mayor I am granted the right to make appointments to Boards. So as an act of courtesy to me, I would like you to do me the courtesy of submitting your resignations.

After the first stunned reaction of gasps, broken by applause and shouts, a picture flashed in the minds of some residents. It was that of a gray building, sinking slowly as an elephant would sink when two tendons had been slashed.

It is now the neighborhood's turn to testify and statements, like spears, are thrust into the body of the arguments put forth by the Redevelopment Corporation. Joe Shaughnessy reminds the Committee of the benefits of keeping such an area intact, and how this plan would destroy it. Harry Hall, area school board member, points out that the school district would stand to lose thousands of dollars through tax abatement and the selling of the Norman School.

Paul Edwards now faces the commission.

... in this plan we have the probability of a grievous wrong being done to those least able to bear the burden of this wrong. We have the probability of a corporation which has deliberately, and with forethought, allowed urban blight to develop in an area – and then who will be allowed to profit from this blight. I say to you, gentlemen, that no corporation should benefit from its own wrongdoing.

This project is the SST of Kansas City. It is ill-conceived. It is for the good of the few and against the long term public interest.

If there are parts of the area that need rehabilitation it is not only the fault of the area. The neglect of the past city administration is partly to blame. I cite these reasons:

- 1) Westport is one of the oldest communities in Kansas City, with many older buildings in need of rehabilitation.
- 2) The City of Kansas City has never provided an effective program of housing code enforcement in the Westport area.

Commenting on the defeat, a representative of the Development corporation referred to the area residents as "pygmies" and said that the "pygmies" had beaten them. He was, in a sense, correct. The residents are the city's "little men," and they laid low that day a beast of the corporate mind.

- 3) By choosing to spend Model Cities, Urban Renewal and Interim Assistance monies exclusively in other parts of the City, the City Government has not provided the resources for maintaining neighborhoods in Westport as buildings begin to decline.
- 4) Attempts to spot zone, and speculation of land will continue to accelerate with continued inaction by the City. Edwards concludes by reminding the committee:
 - 1) Westport is today an essentially healthy area, and remedial action in spots would prevent the necessity of clearance in future years with consequent high social and economic costs.
 - 2) The Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority has successfully and with satisfaction to residents completed rehabilitation projects in Kansas City.
 - 3) Rehabilitation under federal programs, unlike clearance under the State Redevelopment Act, requires community participation in the planning and development of plans.

The lawyer for the residents shows conclusively that in no way does the area fit the description of a blighted area as defined by law.

A blighted area is one which, for reasons of age or obsolescence, is inadequate of "outmoded" design, or physical deterioration has become an economic or social liability, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease and/or the inability to pay taxes. Compare our area and you will find little depreciation value, almost no tax delinquency, low crime rate, etc. An analysis of the blight study will show evidence of an infestation of rats, vermin, and other pests in only 10 homes. We don't have an area of filth. There has been an accusation made that some of this blight has been deliberately created.

We have a person who was standing at the door looking at one of the Kansas City Life homes and saw a person throw garbage out the back door. He (the resident) was there when photographers came and took photographs of the building. I submit to you gentlemen that this is creating a condition or the appearance of a condition by which you hope to benefit by your own wrongdoings.

After a short seven-minute recess, the Planning Commission returns to the room. The Redevelopment Plan is not approved. There is an initial shout of joy. But, quickly, a subdued happiness falls over the Chamber. Some people hug one another. Some applaud quietly. Others are too overwhelmed with relief to say much. It is really a rather quiet victory.

Gloomily, the maps and charts are furled, the briefcases closed. The representatives of the corporation shake their heads and ride the elevators down to the street amongst happy but subdued residents. As the elephant falls under the well thought out plans of the little men, so fell the plans of the Redevelopment Corporation; plans which drew their life blood from the gray stone building on Broadway.

Commenting on the defeat, a representative of the Development corporation referred to the area residents as "pygmies" and said that the "pygmies" had beaten them. He was, in a sense, correct. The residents are the city's "little men," and they laid low that day a beast of the corporate mind. It was their day. It was the day of the pygmies.

The Feast

After the pygmies are successful they settle down to a well deserved feast of elephant. They are thankful for the victory.

On the trip back to the area the busses stopped at Redemptorist Catholic Church. One gray-haired lady, bun-

Late Developments

There are two major developments in the continuing story of Kansas City Life vs. a community.

(1) A suit has been filed by four residents against Kansas City Life. The suit claims actual damages of \$5,000 and punitive damages of \$50,000 for each plaintive. This is the first time a suit of this type has been filed based on an argument that the social and personal welfare of a community and its residents has been endangered by actions of a private corporation. The position taken is that Kansas City Life, by its purchase of property in "straw" names and its allowing the deterioration of this property, has caused a loss of confidence in the area and helped cause neighborhood decay to the detriment of the residents and of the area.

(2) Rep. James Baker introduced a bill which attempted to curb indiscriminate condemnation of areas, provided adequate compensation to those whose homes were condemned, and provided relief for those who wish to maintain their homes in a potentially blighted area. The Missouri House and Senate passed it easily. It was vetoed by former Gov. Hearnes.

A similar, but slightly modified, bill will be introduced in the 1973 session, according to Baker.

dled against the wind in only a cloth coat, turned and said, "We're going in to pray – a prayer of deliverance. Does anyone else want to come?" Two more people got off and the group passed into the Church. In the evening others held services in their homes. Yet another group, on that bitterly chill night, met in the playground of the Norman School, almost directly behind the Kansas City Life building.

Permits had been issued for two fires burning in rusted barrels around which the small group huddled. Off to the side children played hopscotch, their small voices carried off by the cutting wind. Other children played random games of tag, breaking off to roll down the grassy incline. Chords from a guitar provided background to songs started but never finished as if the words froze on chilled lips.

In the background, black against the sky, resurrected and looming high over the area, was the Kansas City Life building. In every window could be seen the brilliant fluorescence of lights, as if the hundred eyes still surveyed the homes and the people gathered beneath their gaze.

The days are numbered for the pygmies of the rain forest. "Progress" is changing much of what they need for their existence. While there might be an occasional elephant trapping, the pygmy remains superfluous, odd, a bother, a representative of a way of life which is not considered in plans for progress. He is really at this point rather powerless to do much to make people responsive to his needs. It is probable that pygmy life, as known today, will disappear. It will be a human and social tragedy when that happens.

The victory of the Valentine Neighborhood Association has become an important case in the history of urban studies. It will probably be cited in many textbooks as an example of what people can do if they "organize." It will probably be used as an example of the responsiveness of government to people's needs. It would be nice if this were true

While the victory was genuine, the idea that it heralds in a time of responsiveness to low-income areas and to people with little power, is simply not true. The conclusion that it could happen again is spurious. Not many people in working-class neighborhoods would know where to begin to fight nor have the time to do so. The victory came through a happy combination of circumstances.

The area has a small group of middle-class professional people and people with experience in government, city planning, and law. For example, Paul Edwards is trained as a lawyer and was at the time director of Urban Programs for the Environmental Research and Development Foundation. Larry Downes is an architect with a master's degree in sociology. Harry Hall was director of Planning for the Metropolitan Interchurch Agency and Mary Hodges was a former public information officer for the city government. All these people have political acumen and organizational experience. They know where to go and who to see to get things done. They know the purposes and uses of power, how to plan to counter other power groups and how to assume power.

In very few working-class areas (indeed lower-middle class areas) and especially so near the central city, would there be this expertise available. Few areas would have people in such key positions so that requests are given serious attention. These people could refer requests to those who would help and not just get a typical bureaucratic response. Indeed, in the opening stages of the controversy these were the only kinds of responses the residents received. "They were," as one person said, "massaging letters just to get us to stop asking questions but at the same time to pacify us." Further, the nature of their professional jobs allow them time for fact-finding, making contacts, having secretarial help, and performing the hundred and one gritty, tedious, and mundane things necessary to the presentation of a case. They would not have the time to follow-up the requests, nor would the 9:00-5:00 whiteor blue-collar worker have time. As Paul Edwards stated:

There would have been no way for us to have waged any kind of fight if most of us didn't have a chance to organize our working time. If we had to keep set hours it would have made research time impossible and contact time impossible. After a full day's work few people have the energy to continue with what is essentially another full day's work. Even in my position I had to work overtime and on weekends to catch up with what I didn't do during the controversy.

Even given the expertise available to the area, the wishes of big business and the short sightedness of some politicians and appointed boards have usually taken precedence over the wishes of citizens.

In this case the expertise found in the area was maximally effective because of the coincidence of city elections with the presentation of the development plan and the date of the hearing. The plans were given most publicity just before the election campaigns began.

A highly placed person in the City Planning Department commented:

They couldn't have picked a worse time to announce their plans. If anything, they beat themselves. What possible stand could a politician take at that time and still stand a chance to be elected? In fact, it seemed as if they were falling over each other to support the neighborhood association. It was good publicity. The good guys against the big bad corporations. Of course the hearing followed right after the election. They still had to keep up that old image.

It is misleading to conclude that this case opens up a new era in which the citizens hold power equal to business interests. In a way, victory was an accident.

Russell C. Doll, a resident of Kansas City, is an educator and observer of public affairs.



Both liberals and conservatives find urban renewal programs unacceptable. Future policies must be designed for people not structures.

Abandoning the Bulldozer Approach

EDGAR L. CHAPMAN

Is there any hope for urban renewal? Can anything good come out of this concept, once considered so promising, which has managed to disappoint so many? Such questions have been asked by disillusioned liberals and frustrated black leaders in cities throughout the United States, and they have been asked very bitterly in Peoria, Illinois, which has a long history of disappointing experiences with urban renewal projects. After September 30, 1971, when Robert Wright, the city manager of Peoria, announced the appointment of Gerald Osborne, as the new urban renewal director, scepticism and cynicism were automatic reactions. The city had considerably failed to make redevelopment work in the past.


Taking office on November 1, 1971, Gerald Osborne, formerly a director of a Carbondale, Illinois, "Black Town neighborhood program, assumed a job with a salary of \$19,000, a new title ("Director of Urban Redevelopment"), and a great many old headaches. In 1968, Peoria had set out boldly on a plan to provide better housing for the black community on its Near South Side, but the result had been a backlash from conservative citizens, the downfall of a mayor and many of his supporters on the council, and the entire program's exile into limbo. The city had over a million dollars worth of worthless ghetto housing, some excess cash on hand, but not enough to attempt any significant construction, and there was no plan, no leadership, and no faith in the positive value of urban renewal. Despite such prospects, however, Osborne in six months has made a dramatic impact on the Peoria scene. Whether he will be able to allay intelligent doubts about urban renewal is another matter.

Disillusionment a Common Emotion

Disillusionment with urban renewal has become a common emotion, and not merely because of abortive projects like the Peoria plan of '68 and '69. There are good reasons for questioning the worth of urban renewal programs, even when they are successfully financed and implemented. In the fifties and early sixties, urban renewal, like many other ideas cherished by liberals, seemed to offer a simple and achievable solution to problems spawned by racism and urban blight. Slum housing, crime, deterioration of the urban environment, black frustration – all these might be eliminated or ameliorated readily, if cities undertook massive rebuilding of the blighted inner city areas. Unfortunately, urban renewal tends to attack such problems on the basis of real estate values and rebuilding, without consideration of human and community values.

A primary objection to the traditional concept of urban renewal is voiced by Gary Fethke, a young, articulate professor of economics at Peoria's Bradley University. "In many cases," asserts Fethke, a scholar of urban economics, "the poor are simply pushed on to another inner city area, which rapidly becomes a ghetto." The new area occupied by the displaced dwellers from the old ghetto quickly deteriorates, Fethke comments, because homeowners there become frightened, especially if blacks and Latins are moving in. They sell their homes too rapidly, and too cheaply. Realtors then make a profit on selling or renting to the incoming poor. City agencies begin to neglect the upkeep of the new area, schools in the area are allowed to decay, and the people removed from the ghetto find themselves in the same fix as before. Meanwhile, the original urban renewal area looks like a shining success: it has become a showcase

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downtown development of commercial office buildings or high rise apartments for young, liberated urban types who want to be swingers.

The Worst of Urban Renewal

That kind of approach represents the worst form of urban renewal; but even if there is some real concern for the poor involved in an urban redevelopment project, the results can be far from satisfactory. Suppose that the planners hope to buy substandard housing, move the residents of the ghetto out, demolish the old dwellings and erect better housing, and make them available for the poor (more or less what was desired in Peoria's moribund 1968 project). The relocation process can be expensive, complicated, and exasperating for the poor. Blacks and Latins face the same segregated housing patterns and bigotry which helped to create the ghetto in the first place. The relocation process may cause the destruction of the only community where they are likely to feel at home. Or, if a new black community is formed by the relocation, should a black family be expected to abandon that and return to the old neighborhood after it has been rebuilt?

Urban redevelopment projects require years to complete. Their fate may be subject to changes in the city administration, as was the case in Peoria, when the Lehnhausen administration was dramatically defeated in 1969. Hence a program, no matter how nobly conceived, may be stalled or killed. As a result, reformers and poor alike are demoralized; false hopes were aroused and disappointment has been the harvest.

But even when a project relocates people satisfactorily and proceeds to create better housing for low income groups, it certainly does eliminate the ghetto. Dr. Kalman Goldberg, professor and former chairman of the Department of Economics at Bradley University, and a veteran fighter for liberal causes in Peoria, considers urban renewal to be a specious solution since it deals with structures and not people. "Urban renewal itself is essentially a city planners' device which starts from the wrong premise," Dr. Goldberg says. "It aims at renovating an urban area, rather than attacking directly the real problem: the provision of decent housing and equality of residential status for blacks and low income city dwellers." For Dr. Goldberg, "gilding the ghetto" is not the way to solve such problems as black unemployment or low income employment, segregated housing patterns, or integrating minorities more effectively into the total community.

In the light of these substantial and realistic doubts about urban renewal, it is surprising to observe that Osborne has infused new energy into Peoria's urban redevelopment projects. Even more astonishing is the fact that he has produced a dramatic reversal of some negative opinions of urban redevelopment.

A New Breed


Osborne is representative of a new breed of reformers and urban developers. Relatively young (in his early thirties), he sports a handlebar mustache and fashionably long sideburns which give him a Western look. A native of Illinois (born in Decatur), he majored in English and history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, and got into urban redevelopment by way of radio journalism in West Frankfort. In conversation or on the platform, his eyes give the impression of immense mental alertness and energy. Disciplined and articulate, he communicates enthusiasm, and he buttresses his ideas with an impressive grasp of urban statistics.

Osborne established immediately the fact that he is well aware of the classic faults of urban renewal, and he seems determined to show that many of them can be avoided. "Urban renewal has been a failure because of the historic image of urban renewal as a man on a bulldozer," he said in a speech at the Unitarian-Universalist Church of Peoria on April 11, 1972. Up until now, Osborne claims, "citizen participation" in urban renewal has been a "meaningless phrase." He conceded that in many cities, "urban renewal has been relocating slums," but he pledged that "it won't be that way in Peoria."

Osborne has visionary plans for Peoria, but when he arrived he had to face immediate problems: citizen apathy and the old project, stalled if not moribund, which was a legacy of the city administration of Robert Lehnhausen. To combat apathy, Osborne moved the Office of Urban Development from City Hall down into the South Side ghetto, having it established in a renovated gas station. Then he proceeded to organize the residents of the South Side ghetto.

The Lehnhausen Legacy

Dealing with the Lehnhausen legacy presented a different problem. The story of this blocked project is symbolic of the misfortunes of urban renewal programs everywhere, and its history casts some light on the problems that Osborne must deal with. By any standards, the administration of Mayor Robert Lehnhausen and his city council took an intelligent and enlightened approach to the problems of the poor, especially the black community. And they adopted a plan for urban renewal which seemed to be practical, ambitious, and idealistic, given the basic assumptions on which urban renewal operates. Planned in 1967, after years of discussion, set into motion in 1968, and then halted, and apparently killed in 1969, the Lehnhausen plan sought to provide better housing, not high rise apartments, for Peoria's pathetically dilapidated Near South Side. The project was not only conceived in genuine civic idealism, but it



seemed to have a chance, for a moment, of being swiftly implemented.

But Peoria may be one place where the voters themselves played a decisive role in the destruction of an ambitious and solidly funded plan. In fact, a white voters' revolt not only demolished the program but caused the fall of a relatively enlightened city administration as well, replacing it with one of questionable competence.

Peoria hardly seems to be the kind of place where an urban renewal program aimed at a \$6 million reconstruction of the ghetto would even reach the planning stage, much less be adopted on the assumption that it could be locally financed

Peoria is a fairly prosperous industrial city in central Illinois, with a population of 128,000 people, about fourteen thousand of whom are blacks. The city and voters are traditionally conservative and Republican for the most part; just ten miles down the Illinois River is Pekin, the hometown of the late Senator Everett Dirksen. At one time, Peoria was a synonym on the vaudeville circuit for cultural provincialism and bluenosed behavior. Yet, like many such Midwestern towns, it was in actuality a wide open city with plenty of gambling, obvious prostitution, and flagrant municipal corruption.

After World War II, a progressive coalition gained power, adopted the council-manager system, reformed the city administration, and generally improved city government to the point where none other than Betty Friedan, now famous as a leader of women's liberation movements, but once a Peorian, wrote a laudatory article on the city in the mid-fifties. In recent years, progressive city administrations have drawn support from the city's major industrial leaders. The executives of Caterpillar Tractor Company, whose main plant is across the Illinois River, in East Peoria; Keystone Steel and Wire; Hiram Walker's Distilling Company; Pabst Brewing Company in nearby Peoria Heights; and lesser industries, and the executives of the banking and

savings and loan interests have tended to support moderate reform, as long as it has been inexpensive.

Peoria talks of civic progress and fiscal responsibility like similar Illinois cities, Danville, Decatur, and Rockford. It crusades against vice and the more visible forms of crime, votes consistently Republican and professes to regard Chicago and Mayor Daley as the worst form of evil. Its conservative legislators in the Illinois Senate and House vote with rural legislators on most matters of legislation affecting cities, and many important conservative Republicans find Governor Ogilvie too far to the left. As the core of the eighteenth congressional district, the city regularly sends to congress Representative Robert Michel, whose voting record might be the envy of Strom Thurmond.

Over eighty percent of the fourteen thousand blacks are confined to two ghetto areas just north and south of the downtown business district, and between the Illinois River and its bluffs. These are areas of substandard housing, and they help to maintain the common urban pattern of de facto segregation in housing. Three public housing developments at the fringes of the ghettos are predominantly black too, although like many such complexes, these were administered on the basis of internal segregation until President Kennedy's executive order ending such practices in 1962.

Faced with these circumstances, Mayor Lehnhausen, a moderately liberal Republican and his city council, elected in the spring of 1965, drew up their plan for major renewal of one ghetto area. The target area for the pilot project was bounded by McBean, McArthur, Second, and Sheridan Streets and thus comprised a solid block of real estate approximately eight square blocks at the heart of the dense south-side ghetto. The Mayor and the Council were undoubtedly inspired by the prospect of easily obtainable federal funds in the early days of the Johnson administration. But they soon found that federal money was in shorter supply than expected, and could be tied up for

onths, and even years in bureaucratic processing of ap-

So in 1968, Lehnhausen and the councilmen took a bold step. They decided that the project could be financed by the city of Peoria itself, an action perfectly consistent with the general Republican philosophy of social improvement through local funds rather than federal. To acquire revenue, the council established a public utility tax amounting to an estimated \$24.00 a household per year. It was proposed that the tax last for no more than five years, during which time it was expected to bring out over \$5 million. After eleven months, the tax had produced a capital fund of \$1.8 million, so it was working even more effectively than initially projected. But then the voters intervened.

The Lehnhausen administration had miscalculated the political effect of the public utility tax on white citizens. They had little experience with taxpayers' revolts, which have since become common. And 1968 was the year of the "middle American," who asserted himself strongly in the national elections. (The Peoria city elections are in the spring of the year following national elections, and seem to follow the trends established in the national contests. In 1965, a moderate-to-liberal group of Republicans was elected.) In the spring of 1969, after the election of Richard Nixon, Lehnhausen's administration was swept from office, and seven councilmen were elected as candidates of a group calling itself Citizens for Representative Government. CFRG was the spearhead of a coalition of small businessmen, union members, minor league lawyers, and know-nothings, most of whom provide the hard core of conservative votes in Peoria.

Most of the new aldermen were Republicans, although one, Joseph Mudd, was a conservative Democrat. Another beneficiary of the protest vote was the new mayor, also a Democrat, E. Michael O'Brien, a lawyer from Kirksville, Missouri, who had moved to Peoria about five years earlier. Clearly the new coalition may have drawn some support from Peoria's perennially weak Democratic party, especially from union members. But party affiliations were really not so important as the candidates' stand against the utility tax.

Another lesson could be read in the election. The CFRG candidates were generally from a lower middle class or working class background, and their victory indicated that control of city government had, for the time being, passed from the hands of the corporate leadership which had backed the Lehnhausen administration.

Although the utility tax was the visible issue in the election, it was clear that an underlying factor was resentment of its purpose, the financing of the urban renewal project. The CFRG candidates had promised immediate repeal of the utility tax, and they were able to exploit anti-black sentiments. John Gwynn, the president of the Peoria NAACP, had called persistently for better housing for blacks, and Lehnhausen and his councilmen seemed to be yielding to Gwynn's demands. Gwynn, a capable man with a justified sense of outrage, has since become the president of the Illinois NAACP. But he is not especially popular with white middle-income voters.

In addition, the working lower middle class in Peoria, like their counterparts elsewhere, found it easy to decide that they had no responsibility to improve the ghetto for "shiftless blacks." Obvious bigotry was not expressed openly in the campaign, and the new aldermen professed after their election to be in favor of urban renewal in principle, if the city didn't have to pay for it. But the voters were not deceived as to the aldermen's attitudes.

Some liberal critics, using hindsight, complained that the Lehnhausen administration had lost touch with the voters; better public relations might have created acceptance for the program. Such criticisms may contain a grain of truth, The working lower middle class in Peoria, like their counterparts elsewhere, found it easy to decide that they had no responsibility to improve the ghetto for "shiftless blacks." Obvious bigotry was not expressed openly in the campaign, and the new aldermen professed after their election to be in favor of urban renewal in principle, if the city didn't have to pay for it.

but, on the whole, they are unfair. It is doubtful that any mayor could have persuaded the citizens to swallow the utility tax, in view of its purpose.

New Council Runs Rampant

The new council proved to be deadlocked, six to six, in its first vote on the controversial tax, but when the mayor cast a decisive vote for repeal on May 13, 1969, the aldermen of Citizens for Representative Government were able to fulfill their promise. The urban renewal program was moribund.

Heady with their triumph, the council proceeded to run rampant for a time, so that even council-manager government seemed imperilled. Working middle class citizens were operating the government now, and they proceeded to show that a major cause of the election's outcome has been a deep resentment against the corporate business leadership which had influenced city government for a long time. Despite fierce criticism from the Peoria Journal-Star, the voice of the city's corporate leadership, and humorous scorn from television newsmen, the council gradually forced the resignations of the city manager, Leonard Caro, the director of public safety, Bernard Kennedy (who represented civilian control of the police), and Max Lipkin, an able legal aide. For a time, the council attempted to run the city without a manager, until this became too much work. Mayor O'Brien, unfortunately addicted to mumbling, proved to be a weak administrator, and many council meetings became notorious for petty bickering.

Finally, in October, 1970, the city hired a new manager, Robert Wright, a man of calm and diplomatic temperament, given to moderate and careful action. Under Wright the corpse of the old urban renewal project received an autopsy.

The city had spent \$1.2 million to acquire property in the target area, leaving a balance of \$600,000 in the urban renewal fund. It seemed a simple matter to acquire matching funds from HUD to continue with the project. But this hope turned out to be illusory at first. HUD refused to accept the city's valuation of its property; the \$1.2 million chunk of real estate was worth only \$300,000 in the assessment of the federal agency. As a result, the city's capital assets amounted to only \$900,000 (\$600,000 balance plus \$300,000 assessment) as far as the federal government was concerned. Thus the city's capital funds and investment had been virtually cut in half in three years,

mainly because the real estate had deteriorated and had been vandalized. Of course, the original owners had evidently profited from the project. (And not only had the real estate been overvalued, but the cash assets of the city had likewise eroded somewhat after almost three years of inflation.)

At length, in the summer of 1971, a compromise was reached between HUD and the city, and the project was authorized to continue. That is, the city was able to demolish 1½ blocks in the target area, and to contract with a Cincinnati firm for the construction of some individual houses and duplexes. Thus the original plan had the chance of gradually being realized, by bits and pieces, extended over a length of time almost impossible to estimate.

Black Disillusionment

The result of all this for the black community was, inevitably, frustration and disillusionment, feelings heightened by the fact that their expectations had been high. For those obliged to move from the target area and relocated at Pierson Hills, a privately developed apartment complex at the edge of town, there was not only frustration but inconvenience and a loss of contact with their community. It is hardly surprising that the urban renewal director, of the Lehnhausen days, Ian Mellan, finally resigned in July 1971 with a sense of futility.

After the historic urban renewal debacle, black leaders and others concerned with those living in low-income housing, turned their attention to other programs. They pinned their immediate hopes on methods such as those provided under Sections 235 and 236 of the 1968 Housing Act (both are forms of rent or mortgage subsidies for low income people residing in homes or apartments developed by private capital; the subsidies are administered in part by FHA). Currently, there are two major private developments of low-rent apartment buildings. Also employed have been the "Operation Turnkey" provisions of the Housing Act, aimed at promoting private development of new housing complexes. These programs all have serious defects: their applicability is limited to those persons or families with moderate incomes; a family of two earning less than \$4,700 would not be eligible for 235 or 236 programs. Moreover, such developments are, according to a report by June Lewis and Willie Taylor, two students of urban economics at Bradley University, "inaccessible to black people." Two thirds of the new housing, which lies a couple of miles from the heart of Peoria, accommodates only 17 percent of its blacks. This small number is probably due to lack of jobs in the suburbs and the difficulty of transportation from the suburbs to the city.

At any rate, such plans represent a piecemeal solution to the problem of better housing for the blacks. Like urban renewal programs, these suburban projects do not strike at the heart of economic and social inequality for blacks.

Osborne Obtains Grant

When Gerald Osborne, the present urban redevelopment director, took over, he was confronted with the Lehnhausen legacy, not only a stagnant program but also responsible for a mood of apathy and disillusionment. He had to do something concrete and dramatic. After six months he did just that: he obtained a grant from HUD which would rescue the Lehnhausen project.

On April 20, 1972, Osborne was able to announce that the city of Peoria had received \$2,126,883 in federal funds to match the city's present capital investment in its urban renewal project. This grant will allow the city to complete the construction of one and two family residences in the original forty-acre area.

Undoubtedly, the grant represents a triumph for Os-

borne, and one which he has sought to exploit for th advantage of his long range plans.

Osborne maintains that the immediate forty-acre tract where residences for low-income citizens will be built is just a beginning. He envisions a master redevelopment plan which would include the remainder of the South Side, and most of the North Side ghetto. The total area comprises an estimated 1500 acres — an impressive figure. He also speaks of strict enforcement of the city's housing code, so that the inner city housing above the bluff will not deteriorate in the meantime, but rather will always provide a "buffer" area between the renewed areas and the suburbs.

Another of Osborne's key ideas is the restoration of the inner city school. "Schools tend to follow the flight to the suburbs," he says, "and it has been years since any new schools have been built in Peoria's inner city areas. Nor has very much financial support been given to the existing schools." By bringing community pressure — embodied in the South Side Action Board which he has organized — to bear on the Peoria school board, Osborne hopes to reverse the trend of ignoring inner city schools.

Osborne thinks that the inner city can become a genuinely humane and tolerable community. He expects opposition from white middle-income citizens, perhaps in the form of angry demonstrations in the summer and fall of 1972.

Osborne looks to federal grants and loans as his major source of funds for the future. Not only is there ample federal money to support the 1500-acre relocation process, but Osborne also points out that each dollar spent in capital improvements by the city — streets, sewers, etc. — in the target area can be the source of some federal matching funds.

Osborne has a workable relationship with the volatile Peoria city council. Naturally, the present aldermen, though instrumental in quashing the Lehnhausen project, are quite ready to take the credit for Osborne's achievements. The major question is whether this honeymoon will last beyond the completion of the present project and the exhaustion of the available funds.

In the long run, Osborne must face the same problems that have plagued earlier attempts at urban redevelopment in Peoria: (one) the city's history in dealing with the ghetto is not reassuring, and (two) the nagging doubts about the real value of urban renewal remain.

Renewal Keeps Blacks in Ghetto

Dr. Kalman Goldberg makes a frank and debunking appraisal of urban renewal in Peoria or elsewhere: "The Lehnhausen administration merely tried to get the city to assume the cost of a decent ghetto for low-income people. Under the present council, the responsibility is shifted back to the federal government. Both plans ultimately have the effect of keeping low-income people, especially blacks, in the ghetto."

Osborne would have to concede the truth of those remarks. His answer is that the ghetto need not be a slum or a place of despair. He seems to be fired by a vision of the ghetto as a self-confident, human community. It does not seem likely that he can make that vision come true in Peoria, despite his record of accomplishment, without improving the economic status of blacks.

If any good does emerge from urban renewal in Peoria, it will be the result of Osborne's fresh ideas and goals.

Edgar L. Chapman teaches in the Department of English at Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois.



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POETRY

ALL MADNESS IS LONELY PREPARATION FOR DEATH / Franchot Ballinger

The way one goes unsteadily and crooked on a dark side street smothering in snow, his eyes and pulse indrawn from things;

the way other anxious, suspecting eyes look out into the cold, not wanting to walk that same mile but knowing it's coming;

that's the way it is, going to meet madness or death. There are a few angels left hanging on from the time when things started to fall;

a few to be seen in the flakes spinning down by the street lights, a brief revenance of leaves from the ripening time.

But otherwise one's alone going up the street to the hill skull, his heart stunted like the wind-gnarled dogwood topping it.

Most of all, looking out becomes unsatisfactory as faces and all other things grow studiedly blank;

the sky, a stranger's or lover's eye, is a mirror with the silver gone in flecks, leaving holes empty of reflection.

This is a time when even stones freeze, when in this winter one draws in,

knowing the contraction is final and that in any warming air what's left of the husk will crack.

SPEAKING TO THE CHICANOS IN RAYMONDVILLE, TEXAS SEEMS LIKE ME / Arnold E. Falleder

Spilling into the travelogue of hope is a technique I've devised for these occasions. The obvious pretends to be my conclusion. Speaking to the Chicanos in Raymondville, Texas seems like me. Somehow it seems like me talking about myself.

The libretto has one continuous unresolved confrontation scene. Wherever I am, hope runs on the horizon in layers of truths, and I undertake the landscape by expressing the problem in terms of what ought to be. Knowing what ought to be is my abandon.

I have lost so much time since college. The air on my words is breath thrusting up ideals, theory and principal parts of speech like a waiter who knows wines. Can I learn about wines after putting this together? To the quick truth they listen.

THE LONG LIFE / Richard E. McMullen

A short life but a merry, my mother would say. She meant nothing by it. Now, my father sits alone at the dead picnic table, and wine makes his head fall sideways.

THE SHEEP HAVE GONE MAD

/ Richard E. McMullen

The sheep have eaten too much dead man's grass, drunk too much bloodied water, breathed too much brave, patriotic air.

Mad from the endless cries of children, they have left their pasturing places and nosed open the doors of houses.

Now they are eating the feet of the tradesmen.

AT HOME / Andrew Dillon

The period rooms at the local museum prison my eye watching ceaseless age frost under the silver teaching us out of our everyday a langrous dustmop is moving every so slowly beyond the far gloom until the unrecording mirror only knows a perfect room.

ETS

Franchot Ballinger teaches at the University of Cincinnati. His poems have been published, among others, in Sou' Wester and Kansas Quarterly. Arnold E. Falleder is a social and economic planning consultant working with minority groups, government agencies, church groups, et al. His poems have been published in Humanist, Christian Century, Nimrod, Chicago Jewish Forum, American Judaism, Dimensions in American Judaism, Midwest Quarterly, New York Herald Tribune, and others; other writings have appeared in Saturday Review and Louisville Courier-Journal. Richard E. McMullen presently teaches English at Scarlett Junior High School in Ann Arbor, Michigan. His poems have appeared in over fifty publications, including Chelsea, Commonweal, Cottonwood Review, Epoch, Northwest Review, New York Times and The Smith. Andrew Dillon teaches in the Department of English at Flagler College, St. Augustine, Florida. His wife, Mary Jane, and daughter, Caroline, have helped him to write by their patience and time-gifts.

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
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No Room for the Poor

SALLY THRAN

Public housing, the one program that comes close to accommodating America's very, very poor, is in trouble. In St. Louis, the Housing Authority Board of Commissioners, having first announced plans for shutting down the city's nine conventional developments, has now decided to attempt to transfer their troublesome operations to the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. These projects, built by the Authority from the 1940s through the mid-'60s, currently house some 25,000 persons. The move to give the housing back to Washington is said by HUD to be unprecedented.

The Board's grounds were financial: rent paid by tenants, limited to 25 percent of income by the three-year-old Brooke Amendment, fell far short of the income needed for operating costs. The federal government was not providing enough subsidy to make up the difference. Officials and technical staff of the St. Louis area office of Housing and Urban Development agreed with the Housing Authority that there was "no fat" in its \$6,700,000 budget or the request for a \$3,900,000 federal subsidy. Until recently, the Authority had been told to expect no more than \$1,600,000 in federal funds.

Insolvency Typical of Public Housing

Similar financial crises are reported across the country. A bulletin of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) says that 20 authorities will be insolvent by the end of this year and that in one more year, one-fourth of all authorities -40 — will have serious deficits.

NAHRO authorities in Akron, Baltimore, and Boston and the National Tenants Organization filed suit last month in District Court in Washington to compell HUD to pay operating subsidies. A National Committee to Save Public Housing, which lists such members as the Congressional Black Caucus and the League of Women Voters of the United States, has asked President Nixon for a "fundamental commitment . . . to preserve and maintain the public housing program as a viable instrument for the low-

income families and elderly who occupy it."

The Office of Management and Budget, which controls the money HUD releases for subsidies, has said it will issue another \$150,000,000 for operating costs. What many municipal authorities are still uncertain of is how those funds will be divided.


As it is, public housing is no bargain for its tenants. Thomas P. Costello, the authority's executive director in St. Louis, admits that many units are in violation of the city's housing code. Large families are crowded into units without enough bedrooms or living space.

St. Louis is the home of Pruitt-Igoe, hailed as a model of public housing when it was built in the 1950s and standing today as a symbol of the many-sided failures of a nation to properly house its poor. Most of the Pruitt and Igoe units have been closed. The 33 eleven-story buildings had 2,190 occupied units with 10,546 persons in 1966, years after it had gained its infamous reputation; today, only 713 units are open. Of these, 643 units are occupied, with a population of 2,788 persons. (Pruitt-Igoe has had a special, whatdo-we-do-next standing with HUD; while a decision on a large-scale renovation plan is pending, HUD has authorized remedial work that is not included in the authority's budget.)

Many of the problems that plague Pruitt-Igoe are found in other high-rise projects, grouped in segregated patterns in the city's near-north and near-south sides. Occupancy in all conventional projects has dropped in the last two years, to 4,718 in September from 5,057 in 1970. Even the last of the conventional projects to be built, a low-rise, pleasant-looking development that has more than 1,100 tenants and a reported waiting list, has residents who worry about security and environment and would rather live elsewhere. North-side tenants are said to be terrorized by a drug war that has been linked to a number of shootings, including the apparently accidental killing of a child.

But most public housing tenants have no bargains waiting in the wings. The alternative for those who feel trapped in public housing is to be trapped in the central city, in housing that is even more substandard but with no legal

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rent ceiling and that is located in the same or similar fearful environment. Many tenants have a loyalty to their particular development and are proud of their efforts to improve conditions. Others say they would have no idea of where they would live if they were forced from their homes.

The housing programs of the 1960s simply did not dip far enough to reach very poor families, neither in terms of quantity nor of subsidies and safeguards against victimization.

No "Dumping Ground"

St. Louis, for example, is also a site of Operation Breakthrough, the government's experiment in industrialized housing that is being carried out in several cities. The St. Louis development will have 10 percent if its tenants admitted under the subsidized rent-supplement program. Local management has rejected suggestions that the percentage be increased. One reason was summarized some months ago by a management spokesman: "We don't want to be a dumping ground."

The trouble is, neither does the Housing Authority. Before its current financial dilemma, the authority and the Tenant Affairs Board drew up a new rental policy that was geared to a greater "economic mix" of tenants. A social worker on the south side said she had stopped checking public housing possibilities for welfare recipients with large families because she had been told they would not be considered.

The Authority's position is that it is not banning all public assistance applicants. Spokesmen say they want to improve conditions for existing tenants, beef up screening procedures and attract tenants who are needy, but not exclusively "the poorest of the poor." They say the financial problem was also anticipated: the more welfare tenants, the lower the rents and the greater the federal subsidy required for day-to-day operation.

In the older, conventional developments, the percentage of families receiving public assistance has continued to increase. In the Vaughn projects, a high-rise near Pruitt-Igoe, for example, 84 percent of families are listed as aid-recipients compared with 68 percent in 1970.

Will Public Housing Come to an End?

The immediate issue, in St. Louis and other cities, is certainly whether the federal government will provide the subsidies authorities say they need for bread-and-butter operations for one more year. But St. Louis housing commissioners have also expressed concern over a lack of modernization money from HUD. Moreover, they once argued that they were prepared to build 2,200 units of the more successful "turnkey" public housing each year for the next five years. (Turnkey projects are smaller, more scattered, built by private developers and turned over to the Authority for operation.) Now, the commissioners are considering whether to declare a moratorium on all new public housing because they are uncertain of the government's long-range commitment to the program.

The central issue is indeed whether there is still a definite commitment to the concept of low-income housing supported in part by federal funds. And if there is, how will it be carried out? "Economic mix" has become a popular phrase and housing specialists who say it is necessary for a viable community may be right. But the greater the mix, the greater the need for more diversification of housing for the poor. So far, only public housing has potential to meet the needs of the poor on a fairly adequate scale; if it dies out or changes direction, there is nothing to replace it.

Sally Thran is a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. "Public Housing in Trouble" is reprinted with permission from The Christian Century.





Rent Strike Leads to Tenant Participation in Management

RICHARD BARON

The inexcusable plight of public housing residents as victims of institutional racism has been well-documented by Harold M. Baron in his recent FOCUS/Midwest article, "Building Babylon" (Vol. 8, No. 56).

The political and social impact of public housing management and development on urban communities has received too little attention in recent years despite the vigorous efforts of tenant associations and other housing groups for greater participation and involvement in local housing authority (LHA) operations. These demands, which generally have been supported by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), directly threaten the control and rigidity of the institution of public housing on a local level. New LHA leases providing for tenant rights are increasingly replacing older, more restrictive leases. Tenant grievance procedures have been implemented by some LHA's. Tenants are being selected to serve as commissioners by LHA's, and tenant associations are given increased attention in developing LHA policies and modernization programs.

The St. Louis Rent Strike

Much of the impetus for these changes came from the St. Louis public housing rent strike which lasted from February 1, 1969 through October 1969. The settlement of the rent strike led to the appointment of two tenants to the

Board of Commissioners of the St. Louis Housing Authority. The strike likewise led to the creation of a Tenant Affairs Board (TAB) which has been formally recognized by the Authority as the representative body of its tenants.

The TAB is composed of nine members who are elected from each of the nine conventional public housing areas in St. Louis for a term of two years. Each of the nine areas has a tenant association of which the TAB representative is the chairman or an officer. The tenant associations are responsible for the implementation of policy on a development level. They screen prospective tenants, work with the Authority in selecting security force employees and deal with a variety of tenant problems such as rent extensions, social service, referrals, and rule violations.

The associations have also developed a network of building or lane captains who assist the TAB representatives in circulating materials, contacting tenants about their particular problems and monitoring Authority modernization, security, and maintenance operations.

The TAB members and their building or lane captains have been functioning in each of their development areas as quasi-management personnel. Their identity as tenant representatives has remained clear, but they have worked with management on a variety of daily concerns such as rent delinquencies, rent extensions and rent adjustments; main-

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nance problems; implementation of their modernization ograms; security force responsibilities; and social service referrals.

All of the TAB representatives have their offices in or near their development rent office which has afforded them the opportunity of learning the operations of the Authority.

The degree of interplay between management and the individual TAB and tenant association member varies with the personalities involved, but the development managers recognize the necessity and importance of the TAB, and they have worked with the TAB representatives and tenant associations in a cooperative manner. The various TAB members have acquired a variety of management skills during the last two years; and for the most part, they are as knowledgeable about the Authority operations as the Authority staff. This has been a necessity and the inevitable results of TAB's desire to represent their tenants effectively.

Tenants Have Responsiblity

The experience of the last two years has convinced TAB and the Authority that the ultimate solution to the rehabilitation of public housing in St. Louis will come only when the tenants themselves have the responsibility for the total management of each development. The management provided by the Authority can never really supply the "soft management" needs of its tenants. The solution to the individual tenant needs and desires within the Authority reduces itself ultimately to each of the nine development communities.

The Authority has sought to develop a sense of responsibility and participation among the tenants within the developments by decentralizing management operations and by sharing decision-making with TAB and the various tenant associations. This process has made changes in the general physical condition of the developments and has improved Authority operations, but the crucial change in the public housing community must come from its tenants. The dimension which is missing from the aforementioned relationship is the ingredient of "peer control" which will ultimately transform the conventional developments from housing of the last resort to an attractive community in which low and moderate income families can live with a sense of pride.

Management Is Sceptical

The Authority management staff in some instances is impatient with the system of tenant participation and jointly shared decision-making. Fifty percent of the management staff does not reside in public housing, which, in turn, means that tenant problems or emergencies which occur after 5:30 P.M. or during the weekend, in most instances, become TAB and/or tenant association problems. This is not to suggest that the Authority staff is not performing as well as it can; but rather to suggest that the tenants themselves are much more adept at isolating and resolving the "soft management" problems which arise within a development and are more effective in "policing" the maintenance and operational work of the Authority.

The experience of the Authority suggests that many tenant problems will never be entrusted to Authority personnel because of mistrust or lack of confidence. The tenant associations and the TAB have managed to reach some of these tenants, but there is much evidence which indicates that if a tenant management corporation were totally in charge there would be many more tenants who would be willing to cooperate fully. The tenant associations and TAB have discussed the introduction of a variety of "software" programs into the development areas, but ten-

It is now quite clear that conventional public housing in major urban areas will never be "decent, safe and sanitary" until the tenants manage their own affairs.

ants are much more willing to get involved with the knowledge that a local tenant organization will be administering the entire development.

Innovative Tenant Policies

The national attention which has focused on the Pruitt-Igoe development of the St. Louis Housing Authority has tended to obscure the very innovative policies adopted by the Authority since October, 1969. There are still administrative problems which arise between the Authority, TAB, and the various tenant associations, but fundamental changes have been made by the Authority.

It is now quite clear that conventional public housing in major urban areas will never be "decent, safe and sanitary" until the tenants manage their own affairs. LHA's cannot provide the soft-management dimension in public housing. The consequences of tenant management for the paternal institution of public housing is all too apparent to those who currently administer LHA's. The loss of influence both in the private real estate market and with construction companies who have profited from lucrative modernizatinon contracts is inevitable. The alternatives, however, are also quite obvious. The Department of Housing and Urban Development will ultimately have to assume the management of thousands of conventional public housing developments unless an alternative can be found to the ineffective management of most LHA's. LHA's are quick to cite the lack of funds as the reason for their management problems; but the lack of operating monies, while admittedly a serious problem, is not the principal difficulty with conventional public housing. Rather, the lack of sensitive and efficient management is the critical issue confronting LHA's. Only when tenants are given a meaningful role in the management will a "solution" for public housing be achieved.

The St. Louis experience has not been easy. Many policies have been changed because of both the persistant and determined efforts of TAB and the willingness of the Authority to accept change. The next innovative step for the TAB and the Authority to undertake is the creation of tenant management corporations within several of the conventional developments in an effort to reverse years of neglect and deterioration.

Richard D. Baron graduated from the University of Michigan Law School in 1968 and came to St. Louis on a Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship to work with the Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St. Louis. It was there that he became involved with the public housing when representing the public housing rent strikers from December of 1968 through the conclusion of the rent strike in 1969. Since that time he has served as a consultant to the Tenant Affairs Board. He is a partner in the firm of Liberman, Baron, Goldstein & Freund.

Will St. Louis Adopt A Meaningful Regional Housing Plan? / STAFF REPORT

The St. Louis region can expect to have some type of regional housing plan adopted by the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council by June 30, 1973. Under a contract with Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) all hearings and the adoption of a regional policy must be completed by that date.

The East-West Gateway Coordinating Council is torn by conflicting interests. Its members represent various governmental units in the St. Louis metropolitan area on both sides of the Mississippi. Therefore, not only must the interests of cities and various institutions be taken into consideration but also those of Illinois and Missouri. Moreover, the political ambitions of its individual members, the pressures from the federal government, and the ultimate concerns of the groups within the populace at large play significant roles in the deliberations of the Council.

The solution for many housing problems must come through legislation, i.e., the political route. To enact the necessary housing laws is a monumental undertaking for any community. If, then, the heads of various political units must act collectively through a regional council, it is that much more difficult.

The regional approach, however, is the only sensible and the only workable alternative to a proliferation of laws and loopholes, frequently contradictory but always too isolated in effect to turn the tide. St. Louis is now in the process of deciding upon an area-wide plan.

Federal agencies in conjunction with local community organizations are also trying out direct housing allowances to families, such as in Kansas City (see page 30). This is one approach which is aimed at people rather than structures, as Edgar L. Chapman recommends in his evaluation of the public housing situation in Peoria, Illinois (see page 16).

In 1969, the Gateway Council approved the need for a regional plan in principal, without being too much con-

IN THIS SECTION

Except for the introductary article (p.28) and those specifically accredited, this material has been excerpted from reports prepared by the staff of the Housing Task Force of the Gateway Council.

In considering a St. Louis Regional Housing Plan, FOCUS/Midwest follows its tradition of giving our readers not only analytical articles but, also raw materials in the form of statistics, and letting them make up their own minds. The articles below discuss

- The proposed Gateway housing strategy (to be amended in early February)
- Comments on the Housing Strategy
- The Dayton Plan
- The Minneapolis-St. Paul Plan
- The Kansas City Plan
- Conclusion and Statistics (including tables on housing, population, and socioeconomic characteristics)
- Policy statements by New Neighbors and American Institute of Planners

cerned with the particulars of implementation. Later the Housing Task Force of the Regional Forum was formed. It is the citizens' participation arm of the Gateway Council and represents various political, social, and economic groups. It developed a strategy for an area-wide housing plan and made recommendations for anti-discrimination laws, dispersed low- and moderate-income housing, revised building and zoning codes, improved regional planning, among many others.

Late in 1972, hearings were held on the proposed strategy (see page 29). Task Force members were surprised at the strong opposition expressed during the hearings, particularly to its recommendation for a dispersal of low- and moderate-income housing. In consequence, the Task Force is now drafting a new strategy which will recommend that the meeting of existing needs in the various communities become the foremost priority.

It appears that the pressure of real estate and allied interests against dispersal in the total metropolitan area have caused this retreat. "Meeting the needs of existing areas" sound rational and, from a pragmatic point of view, might be the most effective approach. It is also quite possible that the dispersal of housing for minorities and low- and moderate-income groups is more the favorite goal of white liberals than blacks, who first want to have a decent home and only secondly are concerned where this home is located.

Nevertheless, the two cannot be separated so easily. "Meeting existing needs" should never become a front for stalling the thrust to break open all-white neighborhoods.

The new strategy — which will be announced on February 7 and on which hearings will start February 26 — does recommend that all new development must include a percentage of low- and moderate-income housing, as is now the case in the Earth City development in Northwest St. Louis County.

The Gateway Council has the power to enforce such policies by its approval power of federal funding requests (A-95). It is another question whether the political leaders on the Gateway Board will use this power. Other cities have done so. Dayton has a working regional plan under which the suburbs are opened to more than two-thirds of all new low-income housing (see page 30).

In Minneapolis-St. Paul a set of housing policies was adopted which called for the dispersal of low- and moderate-income housing (see page 30).

The monumental task of coming up with a plan acceptable to even the majority of the Council members, not to speak of the majority of the more than 100 governmental units in this area, seems forbidding. We cannot share the hope which emanates from the Council. The socioeconomic stranglehold which financial and real estate interests exercise are beyond the reach of the Council. Yet, the Council does have some powers, particularly its funding approval. Sooner or later Council members must decide whether they want to play the role of professional consultants, above the grime of political gameplaying, or whether they will rise to the challenge and use the political power at hand and take the political dirt which will come flying.

The Proposed Housing Strategy

As a result of hearings held, the following draft of a "strategy" prepared by the Housing Task Force of the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council is being revised. While this strategy proposes "disposal" as a priority, the new plan will suggest a policy of "meeting the needs of existing areas" as a priority, leaving "dispersal" of low- and moderate-income housing to new projects under construction.

East-West Gateway has the responsibility of preparing a metropolitan housing plan and regional housing strategy. The objective of this effort is to break the patterns of economic segregation by providing a wider range of opportunities for low- and moderate-income families. The intent of this plan is to preserve and increase the regional supply of low- and moderate-income housing and broaden locational opportunities for low- and moderate-income families.

The basic problem is the lack of an available supply of adequate low- and moderate-income housing. Although there are groups interested in providing such housing and expanding opportunities for low- and moderate-income families, their efforts are often fragmented and their budgets quite limited.

Everyone is interested in the quality, stability, and security of their own neighborhood. People are concerned about the threats to their neighborhood, indeed, all neighborhoods. There has been much confusion as to what a housing plan is and what it would do. This metropolitan housing plan aspires to achieve an appropriate mix and type of housing throughout the region. The housing plan is designed to strengthen neighborhoods. It will not attempt to place inappropriate housing in any community, nor would the plan weaken or in any way disrupt established neighborhoods.

In the formulation of this housing strategy the citizens task force and the Council staff have undertaken to set forth guidelines for development, preservation, restoration, and redevelopment of all community types within the region. The plan is designed to promote understanding of the housing situation. It specifies the necessary actions of the private and public sectors including a discussion of local, state, and federal mechanisms designed to increase the supply and quality of low-and moderate income housing.

The housing plan proposed by the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council is designed to:

- Determine housing needs for the St. Louis metropolitan area.
- 2. Provide a guide for community development: defining the parameters of the neighborhood; and specifying the actions which should be taken by public and non-public sectors. The role of the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council is to act as the catalyst for implementation of the plan. The major tools of implementation are the A-95 review process and the direction of additional subsidies to those communities which are in conformance with the plan.
- 3. Promote public understanding of the extent to which government influences the housing market.

The thrust of this plan is to assist those of low and moderate incomes who are unable to participate effectively within the existing housing market. This includes the elderly, young married couples, and many policemen, firemen, and teachers, as well as the very poor.

We have set forth a community development plan with emphasis on housing development, preservation, restoration, and redevelopment. An attempt was made to apply a case study approach to typical neighborhoods or communities. These neighborhood/community types are found throughout the region in slightly varying forms. There are over 500 communities in the region, each with many varied neighborhoods. We have undertaken to apply the proposed community development criteria to several neighborhood types. In each case we have (a) defined the physical and social characteristics of the neighborhood unit; (b) listed the needs and/or resources within the community; (c) suggested various kinds of assistance programs applicable to each; and, (d) evaluated these suggestions with regard to possible results to the community both with and without their acceptance. We have also set forth a detailed list of policies which not only relate to the housing situation but to basic community problems as well.

In addition to stating policies, major responsibilities and activities of each organization having a role in the regional housing strategy have been outlined. Those whose participation is critical include area citizens, HUD, HEW, and other Federal agencies, financial institutions, local elected officials, zoning commissions, nonprofit housing sponsors, housing authorities, and neighborhood groups.

Formulation of this plan is an "in-process" one, i.e., it will involve a continuous evaluation employing direct feedback and review. The presentation of the initial drafts of this plan are attempts to stimulate participation in the development processes. There will be frequent and continuing opportunity for review not only by local planning agencies, but by all interested groups. A series of public hearings is currently being scheduled throughout the region. It is anticipated that many of the questions raised by these hearings will in fact provide a basis for added and/or modified policies.

Since the presentation of the July 13, 1972 "Revised Draft," feedback from local planning agencies, professional groups and organizations concerned with housing have been substantial. The more important suggestions to evolve from this include:

- Further evaluating housing needs for the St. Louis metropolitan area.
- Determining the needs and/or resources within individual communities.
- 3. Establishing a mechanism for stabilizing and/or promoting additional mixed income residential areas.
- Evaluating proportionate need/allocation of housing at the sub-regional and planning district levels and establishing site selection/locational criteria within each planning district.

Comments on the Housing Strategy



In support of the strategy, the staff of the Housing Task Force issued the following statement as well as summaries of plans in other communities.

As in many other urban centers, St. Louis is moving toward an economically and racially divided metropolitan area. The newer suburbs continue to house the middle- and upper-income whites, while the central cities are left to the blacks and poor whites. The implications of this exceed the bounds of social justice. They are found in terms of increased racial tension, unbalanced tax bases, deteriorating public institutions, continued spread of blight and deterioration, and loss of individual home investment.

In the last ten years, the population of the City of St. Louis has decreased by 127,790; East St. Louis, 11,716. In 1960, St. Louis had 14,333 vacant units; today, 22,962. In 1960, one census tract of relatively undeveloped land in St. Charles County had 9,508 persons; in the last ten years, it has increased by 133%. (Figures are from 1960 and 1970 Census Records.)

The cost of this is prohibitive. Money is wasted continually as we abandon expensive existing services, such as streets and sidewalks, water and sewer, and poor local, state and federal dollars into providing the same services in newly developing areas.

Many individual communities have faced, and are facing, the problem of creeping blight and deterioration... which do not recognize community boundaries. In fact, many areas that considered themselves totally immune from this

kind of problem fifteen years ago, are facing it today with all of its implications. Yet there is no one community that can solve this problem alone. The problem is regional, the solution must be regional.

There are efforts underway to provide a regional solution. One such effort is the proposed housing plan of the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (page 29).

The Housing Task Force of the Regional Forum (the citizens' participation arm of the Gateway Council, representing various political, social and economic groups) also has proposed a list of priorities and policies which indicate four general areas of agreement:

- The Task Force is not in favor of the policy of containment i.e., limiting the choice of housing for the poor and black to a few areas of the Region.
- 2. The problems of inner cities should have highest priority.
- It is the responsibility of the Region to house low- and moderate-income families in decent, sanitary housing.
- 4. The Task Force is in favor of expanding opportunities for low- and moderate-income housing, throughout the entire Region.

The Dayton Plan

The primary objective of the "Fair Share Plan" is to disperse 14,000 units of Federally subsidized housing throughout the Dayton, Ohio metropolitan area on a "fair share basis," computed on the basis of both community needs and capacities. In other words, it is a plan to build housing for low- and moderate-income families, including public housing in white suburbs.

Adoption of the Plan was the culmination of carefully worked-out strategy and an educational campaign. The difficult part was to determine how to allocate the needed housing to the communities of the region, to arrive at local quotas that were reasonable in planning terms and feasible in political terms.

The plan adopted divided the region into 53 planning units. The needed housing was assigned to the planning

units, using a formula made up of six factors: (1) equal share; (2) proportionate share of the county's households; (3) proportionate share of the county's households making less than \$10,000 annually (or less than \$7,000 in the three rural counties); (4) the inverse of 3; (5) a share based on the assessed valuation per pupil; and (6) a share based on the relative overcrowding of the school districts.

The three main features of the plan were that distribution was made in hard figures, second, the formula reflected enough factors to make it sensitive to a few critical characteristics of the planning units, and, third and most important, the major tool of implementation is the A-95 review process, which enables a regional council (such as the East-West Gateway Council) to withhold funding approval on requests for federal grants.

The Minneapolis-St. Paul Plan

By 1980, 175,000 new housing units will be needed in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Almost half of these new units will be requested by low- and moderate-income families. Through the use of a housing plan, called the Metropolitan Housing and Development Guide and Allocation Plan, most of these units will be outside the central cities.

The Metropolitan Council of Minneapolis-St. Paul is unique in several ways. It is a body of 14 members and a chairman appointed by the governor of the State of Minnesota.

It is empowered by the state legislature to collect tax. The Council's success in getting needed laws through the Minnesota legislature has led to the development of statewide building codes and other housing legislation.

The area served by the Metropolitan Council includes the twin cities and the seven surrounding counties. This is the nation's 15th largest metropolitan area. Seventy per cent of all low and moderate income housing is in the two center cities, as are 93 per cent of all blacks.

The Council adopted a set of housing policies in 1971 which called for the dispersal of low and moderate income housing and very recently the final Housing Element was published. The allocation plan assigns municipalities or parts of municipalities to one of four priority groups. These are determined by the amount of development and services in the area. The highest priority group is those areas with 35 per cent or less undeveloped land. Within that grouping,

prther priority is given to those communities not having absidized housing. This means that areas which already have their fair share of low and moderate income housing will not be overburdened with more, and new housing will go to developed areas which can provide needed services.

Because of the exceptionally large concentrations of assisted housing in the two center cities, they have been given a conditional top priority rating. Minneapolis and St. Paul will receive only enough units to meet urban renewal commitments and remain eligible for federal funds. The remainder and majority of regional subsidy funds will be devoted to projects outside the cities.

The allocation plan essentially is a priority plan to pro-

vide a guide for developers of subsidized housing within the region. To further implement dispersal, the region has been subdivided into seven subsectors, each of which has been assigned a specific number of units to be built within the next two years. These units will be placed in top priority areas according to the allocation plan.

The tool for implementing any regional housing plan is the A-95 review. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, applicants for federal housing funds have pre-review counseling from the staff. This enables the staff to steer housing to priority areas. Funding advantages for parks and sewers go to those communities implementing the housing plan.

The Kansas City Plan

The Direct Housing Allowance Program ("DHA") is an experimental three-year rent assistance project funded by the Model Cities Program of Kansas City, Missouri. Now in its second year, this new method for providing housing subsidies to low income families is the first of its kind in the country.

Basically, the housing allowance is a monthly payment made to low-income families. It enables them to seek and rent standard housing on the private market with a minimum of governmental involvement. This freedom to choose from a variety of homes and locations is a distinct advantage over other programs, which tend to restrict the poor to certain buildings and neighborhoods.

Participants – limited to 213 families – were selected from residents of substandard or public housing with incomes corresponding to those set in Kansas City for public housing.

Allowance amounts were determined by deducting 25 per cent of a family's adjusted gross income from the cost to rent a suitably sized home. Thus the allowance was not based upon actual rent. For example, the schedule rent for a 3-bedroom home is \$200, but if a family rents a unit for less than \$200, they will pay less than 25 per cent of their income towards the rent.

This formula enables recipients to maximize the allowance. In fact, the majority of DHA families pay less than 25 per cent of their incomes for rent. The average monthly housing allowance is about \$120. The average amount paid by recipients using their own funds for rent is \$19.

The original families have an annual income of under \$3,000, and were considered difficult to house, the ones often excluded from public housing. A short orientation course helped families to learn that they could search any-

where in the seven-county metropolitan area for standard housing, and how to deal with landlords. Most families found housing within the 60 days allowed; for others it wasn't as easy. Many had difficulty getting transportation to see available units, others could not find enough listings, and when they did, had trouble finding housing that would pass inspection. Problems were experienced with landlords. Some refused to rent to families with children or on welfare, others practiced outright racial discrimination.

The majority, however, did not. A few landlords have complained about tenants not paying their rent or damaging property, but most families apparently are meeting their obligations as tenants.

There has been much enthusiasm for the program. Nearly all participants are pleased with the greater privacy, quiet, and pride of occupancy in less crowded neighborhoods. But there are continuing problems: many participants have not found adequate transportation in their new neighborhoods. Others need counseling in income and home management. About one-third still have difficulties with landlords. About 30 families have dropped out. All of the remaining families must face the problem of where to live when the three-year allowances end.

The families were given allowances on condition that they move to better housing. But all the families moved only to the fringe of the ghetto, not out. This did nothing to reduce racial concentration.

Later this year some 3,000 families in Pittsburgh and in two Massachusetts cities, Springfield and Holyoke, will get cash from the federal government and will be asked to move to better housing. In 1973, 12,000 families in twelve cities will participate in a nationwide allowance experiment.

Conclusions and Statistics

The housing problem permeates every sector of seven counties of Missouri and Illinois and the City of St. Louis that make up the Gateway Region. There are over 122,000 inadequate housing units in the St. Louis region.

The average cost of a new home in 1960 was \$22,000. The average price of a new home today is \$32,000. It is estimated that an annual salary of \$15,000 is required to purchase this new home, but 76 percent of the people in this region make less than \$15,000 a year.

This inability to buy a new home by so many of what we consider to be middle-income people is a major factor contributing to the housing problem of the region.

What about low-income people? If a middle-income family is priced out of the new home market, it follows that

families with low incomes are in even more critical circumstances.

152,000 families, more than 1 of every 4, in this region make less than \$7,000 a year.

This 25 percent is not just inner-city families. It is true that 61,000 families in the City of St. Louis have incomes of less than \$7,000 – but it is also true that, in St. Louis County – one of the more affluent counties in the United States – there are 36,000 families with a yearly income of less than \$7,000.

There is discrimination against the building of apartments. There is a fear of large numbers of children crowding the local schools, or an influx of people overcrowding the facilities, or a fear of transient occupants who will have

no stake or interest in the neighborhood. A 1972 study on apartments in St. Louis County by the St. Louis County Department of Planning revealed some facts that refute the generalizations about apartment dwellers: "... Typical apartments more than pay their way in taxes, relative to single family homes. In fact, when one considers such common features of modern apartment developments as swimming pools and year-round clubhouses, additional figures can be cited to prove that apartments do not over-

burden community services and facilities. . . . "

A regional housing plan must deal with prejudice against the poor, against large families, against the blacks, and against the lack of enforcement of fair housing laws. It has to consider landlord neglect, increased maintenance costs, unscrupulous real estate practices, panic selling, overcrowding, crime, vandalism, and tenant irresponsibility. Lending institutions and insurance agencies must restore confidence in certain areas and insist on the enforcement of codes.

NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS* IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION

COUNTY	1960¹	1970²	% change 1960-70	1980 projection ³ ⁴	% change 1970-80
St. Louis Co., Mo.	198,483	283,139	+43%	360,600	+27%
St. Louis City, Mo.	248,651	215,479	-13%	179,700	-16%
Jefferson Co., Mo.	18,580	29,777	+60%	61,000	+103%
St. Charles, Co., Mo.	14,579	25,926	+78%	54,150	+111%
Franklin Co., Mo.	13,483	16,978	+26%	22,100	+29%
St. Clair Co., III.	77,530	86,347	+11%	103,100	+19%
Madison Co., III.	67,063	78,470	+17%	97,200	+24%
Monroe Co., III.	4,629	5,757	+24%	7,500	+30%

^{*}Occupied housing units (averaging 3.3 persons per household in 1960 and 1970; 3.2 persons per household projected for 1980).

NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS

IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION IN 1970

COUNTY	Total dwelling units*	Inadequate Units**	Percentage inadequacy
St. Louis Co., Mo.	291,593	32,500	11%
St. Louis City, Mo.	238,441	48,600	20%
Jefferson Co., Mo.	33,268	2,800	8%
St. Charles Co., Mo.	27,903	6,500	23%
Franklin Co., Mo.	19,342	2,700	14%
St. Clair Co., III.	91,320	15,000	16%
Madison Co., III.	82,230	13,000	16%
Monroe Co., III.	6,148	1,300	21%

^{*}Includes only year-round housing, not seasonal or migratory.

**Inadequacy refers to condition of existing structures. Definition of inadequacy from East-West Gateway Coordinating Council's Need Study, June, 1972. These figures are in process of being refined, using more complete census information.

Following is a partial listing of St. Louis area organizations which can offer additional information and service in housing:

Resources in Housing

America 2000

300 S. Grand Blvd., 63103 / 289-2214 Counsels on home purchases.

Greater St. Louis Committee for Freedom of Residence

5868½ Delmar, 63112 / 862-1118 Provides legal services in cases of discrimination.

Housing Task Force, East-West Gateway Coordinating Council

720 Olive St., Suite 2110, 63101 / 421-4220

Conducts regional planning and research.

Has available for inspection or purchase (\$5) complete listing of agencies connected with housing issues.

Human Development Corporation, Housing Section

1321 Clark, 63103 / 241-7500 Finds people homes to stay, mostly in emergency cases.

New Neighbors

801 DeMun, 63105 / 862-4546 Helps minority families to secure homes in St. Louis County.

People's Coalition Against Lead Poisoning

St. Stepher Episcopal Church (Rev. Bill Stickney)

14th and Pork 62104 (421 2579)

14th and Park, 63104 / 421-2579 Involved in widening awareness of and pressuring of key real estate owners on lead poisoning.

Urban League, Operation Equality 4401 Fair, 63115 / 371-0040 Counsels with families on renting and buying homes.

Sources for Statistics: (1) 1960 Census; (2) 1970 Census; (3) Office of Research Administration, Univ. of Missouri; (4) Southwestern III. Metro. Area Planning Comm.

These tables were prepared by the Housing Task Force in apport of the proposed housing strategy. The communities cited typify conditions in the metropolitan area. (SMSA refers to Standard Metropolitan Statiscal Area which includes eight counties on both sides of the river.)

HOUSING AND POPULATION, 1970

 			
	St. Louis City	Ellisville	SMSA
Population:			
Total Population	622,236	4681	2,363,017
Percent White	59.1%	99.6%	84%
Percent Negro	40.9%	.4%	16%
Percent under 18	31.8%	44%	35.5%
Percent over 65	14.7%	4.7%	9.8%
Housing:			
General:			
Total Units	238,485	1268	785,498
Total Occupied Units	215,479	1228	736,116
Percent owned	40.5%	82.2%	64.6%
Percent rented	59.5%	17.8%	35.4%
Median Household Size, person		3.7	2.7
Median House Size, room	4.0	5.6	4.7
Financial:		0.0	•••
Median Value	\$13,200	\$20,200	\$16,300
Median Rent	\$68	\$155	\$79
Percent of all owned units less	Ψ-5-5	Ψ. σσ	Ψ, σ
than \$10,000 in value	25.7%	1%	16%
Percent of all rented units less	20.770	170	10%
than \$80 rent	67.5%	7.5%	49%
Condition Factors:	07.070		7070
Units without adequate plumbir	nn 15.776	24	37,404
Percent of all units	6.6%	1.9%	4.8%
Units that are overcrowded*	27,402	83	73,673
Percent of all occupied units	12.7%	6.8%	10%
Units over 30 years of age	175,876	74	326,015
Percent of all units	75.7%	5.8%	41.5%
*1.01 or more persons per room	1		

SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1970

	University City	East St. Louis	SMSA
Income Distribution of Households:			
Less Than \$5,000	12%	50%	25%
\$5-9,000	27%	28%	30%
\$10-14,999	27%	15%	26%
\$15,000+	34%	7%	19%
Median Family Income	\$11,769	\$6,654	\$10,504
Total Population:	46,309	69,996	2,363,017
Percent White	79%	30.9%	84%
Percent Negro	21%	69.1%	16%
Poverty Status:			
Families in Poverty	542	4,635	48,010
Percent of All Families	4.3%	29%	8.1%
Persons in Poverty	3134	23,549	255,156
Percent of Total Population Percent of Persons in	6.8%	33.8%	10.9%
Poverty 65 years and over	31.7%	12.1%	20.8%
Education: (Persons 25 and Over)			
Median School Years complete	12.5	9.4	11.7
Percent High School Graduates	60.9%	29.4%	48%
Percent College Graduates	21.8%	3%	10%
Employment: (16 Years and Over)			
Percent Males Unemployed	3.1%	10.1%	4.5%
Percent Females Unemployed	3.8%	10.6%	5.6%
Housing:			
Median Value	\$19,325	\$8,000	\$16,300
Median Rent	\$118	\$63	\$79
Median Household Size, persons Median Number of	2.4	2.6	2.7
Rooms Per Unit	5.3	4.3	4.7

ESTIMATED HOUSING NEEDS, 1970

	East St. Louis	University City
Demand for Housing: Households	21,516	16,373
Supply of Housing: Owner Occupied Units Renter Occupied Units Vacant For Sale Vacant For Rent Vacant Other	10,738 10,778 214 1,374 507	10,066 6,307 161 235 180
Total Supply	23,611	16,949
Vacant For Sale Over 6 Months Vacant For Rent Over 2 Months Occupied Units Without Plumbing Estimated Units Deteriorated With Plumbing	91 945 1,710 3.322	50 91 119 880
Total Inadequate Supply	6,068	1,140
Total Supply Inadequate Supply	23,611 6,068	16,949 1,140
Adequate Stock	17,543	15,809
Estimated Need Demand Adequate Supply	21,516 17,543	16,373 15,809
Need	3,973	564

New Neighbors Endorses Regional Housing Plan

The following statement was made to the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council at a public hearing on the adoption of a plan

Over three-fourths of the people in the St. Louis region cannot afford to buy a new home in St. Louis County today. The average price is \$32,000 which means a buyer must earn at least \$16,000 a year or about \$315 a week in order to qualify. Unless there are two wage earners in the family, newspaper reporters, Ph.D. teachers, and chemical engineers, cannot purchase housing in St. Louis County.

The rental picture is at least as bad. According to the Homebuilders Association, the rent for a new three-bedroom apartment would have to be from \$230 to \$275 for a builder to be able to cover his costs. In order to qualify for a \$250 apartment, a renter has to make that amount in a week. His annual salary has to be at least \$13,000! Today's private building industry can only build for one-fourth of our population unless government subsidies are provided.

Even if the federal government continues to provide low interest loans and similar subsidies for builders, where are the homes and apartments to be built? Virtually every area in the city and county has some neighborhoods of substandard housing. At least 30,000 families are already living in such housing in the county, and an additional 50,000 families in the city. That is, 15 percent of our existing housing needs to be repaired or replaced.

Suburbanites are concerned that the construction of subsidized housing would mean the ruin of their community.


With a strong, regional housing strategy, communities can provide housing opportunities for people with varying economic backgrounds, and yet can still protect the qualities that attracted the present residents in the first place.

FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAMS

Income eligibility limits per year for 4 person family	St. Louis City: \$5000 St. Louis County:	\$5200 Madison County: St. Clair County: \$6000	St. Louis City: \$6750	St. Louis County: \$7020 Madison County: St. Clair County: \$8100	
DESCRIPTION	Operated by Housing Authority. Funded by H.U.D. Tenant pays 25% of income for rent. Includes conventional public housing, units leased from private owners by Housing Authority, and Turnkey, the purchase or lease of new housing by the Housing Authority from a private developer.	Tenant pays 25% of income in privately owned market interest rate housing, H.U.D. pays owner up to 70% of FHA-approved market rent. In 236 housing, up to 10% of tenants may receive rent supplements.	H.U.D. makes payments to conventional lender to reduce owner's interest payments (to 3% for 221 (d) (3) or to 1% for 236). This interest reduction enables owner to charge reduced (basic) rents. Tenant pays the basic rent or 25% of his income, whichever is greater. Sponsors limited to non-profit and limited dividend corporations.	Program open to private, for-profit developers. FHA pays lender difference between market interest rate payments and 20% of the buyer's income, thus reducing mortgage payments to as low as 1%. Down payment may be as low as \$200.	Pilot program to give lower income people freedom of choice about where to live. Eligible family is given a direct government subsidy to pay difference between 25% of family income and the market cost of suitable housing. Tenant is free to choose where to live and deals directly with his landlord.
TYPE	Public Housing (Turnkey)	Rent Supplement	Sections 236 and 221 (d) (3) Rental Housing	Section 235 Home Ownership	Housing Alfowance

SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN ST. LOUIS

COUNTY									
			Z	MBER (F HOU	NUMBER OF HOUSING UNITS	SLIN		
	g.	Public Housing	92	Rent Supplement	plement	Section	Section 236 & 221 (d) (3) Rental	(P) L:	Section
	For Families	For Etderly	Being Develop- ed	For Families	Being Develop- ed	For Families	For Elderly	Being Develop-	235 Homes
St. Louis City Mo.	3432 (+3299 not habitable)	2135	295	270	772	1851	882	150	437 (35 new)
St. Louis Co. Mo.	220	120	394	104	1	780	815	108	471 (152 new)
Jefferson Co. Mo.	1	1	80	ı	I	ı	ı	1	84 (76 new)
St. Charles Co. Mo.	28	ı	ı	1	ı	ı	ı	ı	124 (107 new)
Franklin Co. Mo.	i	I	ı	ı	ı	I	I	1	13 (12 new)
St. Clair Co. III.	304	93	ı	ı	125	264	ı	I	
Madison Co. III.	706	146	I	1	1	160	1	28	250-300 (85% new) exact count not available
Monroe Co. III.	1	1	ı	-	-	1	t	1	



St. Louis Must Act

The following are excerpts from a report by the St. Louis Metropolitan Section of the American Institute of Planners. The Institute is a professional organization in planning activity. The report was made possible through a grant from the Danforth Foundation to the Institute. It was researched and written by Steve Colby and edited by Ray Beckly.

The St. Louis Metropolitan Area faces a housing problem of major proportions. It is a problem that most directly affects those living in poverty, but whose implications reach far beyond any one group or geographic community. It is a problem that demands concerted action on a regional scale....

In light of this situation, the St. Louis Metropolitan Section of the American Institute of Planners presents this document which examines the dimensions of the housing problem, and the nature of the process which has created it. The analysis suggests the necessity of a united strategy stated in the form of a Regional Plan. The basic elements required of a successful plan and various housing approaches that are working in other communities are also reviewed.

The Housing Problem

Despite the substantial investment of public and private funds into housing during the last 10 years, the St. Louis region is today characterized by:

- An estimated 140,000 dwelling units which do not meet basic housing standards;
- Almost 100,000 families who pay more than 25 percent of their income for rental units, and about the same number who make home payments in excess of this amount.
- More than 78,000 families who live in overcrowded conditions, many without even basic plumbing facilities.
- Large sections of the central cities and adjacent suburbs which have experienced devastating blight and widespread abandonment.

The Filtering Cycle

One of the fundamental aspects of the housing problem is the continual movement of people from one neighborhood to another as their housing ages and their lifestyles change. Such movements cause shifts in the density and characteristics of the population in a neighborhood which in turn produce changing demands on transportation facilities (roads and buses), public services (police, fire protection, libraries, schools), and utilities. When these changing needs are not adequately met, the transition results in social problems. Where no one has the confidence to maintain and invest towards a neighborhood's continued usefulness, the transition produces premature deterioration of the housing.

As a neighborhood filters from new high-or middle-value homes through aging middle-and moderate-value homes, the incomes, skills, and political resources of the residents are adequate for them to handle the transitions within the existing regulations and private market. Many of these neighborhoods do not filter in value because there are enough households willing and able to provide maintenance and renovation. It is in the transitions to deteriorated housing and low-income population that the waste and exploitation become obvious enough to require public assistance. Thus, the central focus of a regional housing plan must be to stabilize filtering neighborhoods and to remedy the distress of those forced to live in deteriorated dwellings.

St. Louis Housing Trends

During the decade of the 60's many of the 677,000 housing units in the St. Louis Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) were converted into two or more apartments, while others were abandoned and/or demolished for a net loss of 83,000 units (see Table A). This net loss was

Table A Changes in the Housing Stock, St. Louis Region*, 1960-1970

Year Built	1960 Total Units	Substandard	1970 Total Units	Estimated Substandard		et Change in tal Units
1965-69			99,549	2,000	+	190,082
1960-64			90,532	3,000		
1950-59	182,997	4,802	170,998	16,000	_	82,734
1940-49	78,467	6,544	97,012**	119,000	-	
1939 and earlier	415,294	84,193	326,015			
Totals	676,758	95,539	784,106	140,000	+	107,348

Source: U.S. Census 1960-PHC (1)-131 Table H1; U.S. Census 1970-PHC (1)-181 Table H2. Figures are for the SMSA as defined in 1970.

Table B Changes in Housing Stock by Sub-Area*, 1960-1970

Sub-Area	Net Loss of 1960 Stock	Net Construction 1960-1970	Net Change 1960-1970
St. Louis City	39,979	15,438	- 24,500
St. Louis County	18,158	102,298	+ 84,140
St. Charles County	2,755	14,165	+ 11,400
Jefferson County	3,354	14,565	+ 11,200
Madison County	6,906	18,546	+ 11,600
St. Clair County	9,696	19,334	+ 9,600
Franklin County	1,985	5,735	+ 3,750
Totals	82,833	190,081	+ 107,190

Source: ibid. "net loss" indicates total demolitions minus conversions. "net construction" indicates new construction minus any demolitions.

Table C Inadequate Housing, 1970*

Sub-Area	Overcrowded **	Without Plbg.	Renter Households Overexpended	Estimated Substandard Units	Total Units
St. Louis City	27,400	15,800	49,200	70,000	238,500
St. Louis County	19,400	4,900	28,300	32,000	291,600
St. Charles County	2,800	1,700	1,500	4,000	28,100
Madison County	7,700	3,900	6,800	11,800	82,300
St. Clair County	10,500	5,600	11,500	15,200	91,300
Jefferson County	3,900	2,800	1,400	5,000	33,700
Franklin County	1,800	2,700	900	3,000	19,900
Totals - SMSA	73,500	37,400	99,600	140,000	785,400

Source: U.S. Census, 1970, PHC (1)-181, Tables H1 and H2.

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^{**}In the case of houses built between 1940 and 1949, conversions exceeded demolitions

^{**}Overcrowding is defined as more than 1 person per room.

Minimum Goals and Objectives

The plan must incorporate a series of long range goals and specific objectives for a housing program. At minimum these should include:

- the provision of adequate housing to all who need it within the Region. Adequacy should be defined as a housing structure costing no more than 25 percent of a family's income, meeting minimum code standards, in a reasonable neighborhood environment, with good access to major transport routes, schools, and medical facilities.
- the stabilization and maintenance of existing neighborhoods which are now adequate but show signs of impending deterioration.
- the development of new residential areas in appropriate vacant or abandoned areas.

more than offset by new construction in the decade totaling 190,000 units. Thus, the region experienced a net gain of 107,000 units which accommodated an increased in population of 258,000 and a decline in the average number of persons living in each dwelling.

These changes, occurred throughout all jurisdictions of the metropolitan area. However, as might be expected, the brunt of housing losses occurred in the City of St. Louis, while the majority of new units were built in St. Louis County (see Table B).

Most of the housing units which were lost were at the lower end of the value spectrum, abandoned when low-income families moved into slightly better housing left by moderate-income families. These families had, in turn, moved into middle-income neighborhoods which had been vacated by families moving into newly constructed units. Thus, the poor become associated with blight because they are forced by their poverty to take those homes which no one else wants.

Despite all of these changes and the large numbers of dollars spent by public and private agencies to improve local housing, the region was faced in 1970 with:

- over 73,000 units overcrowded, 4,300 of which were without plumbing facilities.
- over 99,000 renting families paying more than 25 percent of their income for housing, 98 percent of whom had income below 10,000 dollars.
- an estimated equal number of owner occupant households paying over 25 percent of their income on housing.
- and an estimated 140,000 occupied units classified as structurally substandard.

Government Regulations

Of major importance to the individuals and institutions making investment and maintenance decisions in housing are government regulations. These are composed of the myriad federal, state, and local regulations, taxes and subsidies which affect the legality and profitability of their activities. Examples of these regulatory and fiscal rules and their consequences include:

• the regulations of mortgage lending institutions through lending laws which favor some types of housing over others, notably on-site over modular or factory-built construction, thereby slowing the development of these new techniques.

- the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans' Administration (VA) mortgage insurance programs which have made explicit efforts to direct the flows of mortgage funds within housing, sometimes producing wasteful conflict in their efforts.
- the federal income tax deduction for mortgage interest payments which provide a subsidy to home ownership that increases with the value of the home and therefore with the income of the household, without similar assistance to renters.
- the structure and administration of local property taxes which has inhibited renovation and encouraged division of the tax base. This has caused duplication and inefficiency in the provision of many public services and wide disparities in revenues per capita among the region's communities.
- local building and housing codes which have fragmented and restricted housing production, thereby discouraging mass production techniques and rehabilitation efforts.
- labor regulations which have not provided for adequate competition, efficiency, and innovation in the construction industry, thus contributing to the rapid rise in construction costs.

Mortgage Lenders

The lending institutions that finance the purchase and rehabilitations of homes often have the most direct influence in determining the course of a neighborhood. Within considerable state and federal regulation these firms naturally strive to maintain their profits. They issue mortgages (loans where the collateral is the real estate being mortgaged) at various maturities, interest rates and portions of the market value of the property, based on their assessment of the future value of the property and the ability of the mortgagee to maintain regular payments.

Through a mortgage loan, these institutions invest in both a house and the surrounding neighborhood which will largely determine its value. It follows that as large investors with short-term profit needs the lending institutions must distribute and protect their investments in such a manner as to maximize their net income. Thus, they are continually involved in the real estate market, anticipating and directing it through their mortgage lending policies.

While it is true that these institutions are the primary vehicle for the withdrawal of resources from a neighborhood, the driving force behind the deterioration is not easily discovered. Whether through ignorance or careful calculation, many institutions have determined that they cannot profitably sustain investments in a variety of neighborhoods. The effect of such an adverse rating has typically been crippling.

Housing Construction Assistance

A housing program could require the public authorities to provide new and rehabilitated homes to the poor at reduced cost. The public housing, rent supplement, and interest subsidy programs are of this type. Either units are owned outright by the government, or provided financial assistance through agreement with the private, often limited-dividend owners.

In the past, many of these units have been built in deteriorated areas as part of urban renewal efforts. Too often large in scale, these efforts have had difficulty contributing to residential communities that could sustain the essential services and self-confidence. However, throughout the nation there have been many successful projects, including notable examples, such as Laclede Town and Parkview Towers, in our own region.

On the reasoning that the poor receive more adequate

public services, education, and access to jobs through closer association with middle and high-income residential areas, a new type of program has been initiated in many metropolitan areas. The so-called fair share programs allocate subsidized low-and moderate-income units either to new private residential development or to political jurisdictions of the metropolitan area.

Fairfax County, Virginia, and a number of other county governments have initiated requirements that a proportion of low- and moderate-income housing be included in large new residential developments as part of the necessary zoning and construction permit criteria. The Earth City project in St. Louis County is a local example of an application of this procedure.

The more ambitious of the fair share programs allocate the units to political jurisdictions of the metropolitan region on the basis of estimates of need and capacity. The Dayton, Ohio, and Washington, D.C., regional housing plans are of this type. After considering the regional need for lowand moderate-income housing and the density and public service capacities of the various component sub-areas, these plans assign responsibility for a quantity of subsidized units to each sub-area. The Fair Share Housing Plan for San Bernadino, California, goes so far as to specify design criteria including height, number of units per site, and access to transportation.

The major thrust of these programs is to encourage the distribution of low- and moderate-income households throughout the metropolitan area. Since there are inadequate funds to relocate even a significant portion of the poorly housed families, the problem of significant housing decay in certain areas will remain. Also, since the schooling, transportation, recreational, and cultural needs of the low and moderate income households may differ from those of the surrounding households, the location of government-assisted housing must be carefully considered.

Housing Allowance

In its simplest terms, the poor are inadequately housed because they lack the income to provide themselves with the structures and skills necessary to occupy and maintain adequate housing. Therefore, many observers have proposed that a program should give a housing allowance directly to low- and moderate-income families based on their needs and the cost of adequate housing. The Direct Housing Allowance Experiment of Model Cities in Kansas City, Missouri, is testing such an approach as are the guaranteed-income experiments in Newark and other parts of the country.

The promise of this type of program is the avoidance of the stigma of subsidies assigned to specific dwelling units and the allowance of some freedom of choice for families. presumably increasing the probability that they would create or join a stable and self-confident neighborhood. This program would hopefully also avoid some of the extensive costs of relocation by promoting the redevelopment of existing deteriorated areas through the initiative of the present residents. Experience with similar programs has shown that, as with post-World War II GI's, families with newly acquired income require counseling on the acquisition and care of adequate homes, and diligent protection from exploitation. Based on experimentation to date, the benefits of housing allowance programs appear promising. However, substantial federal legislation will be required before a widespread program in St. Louis is possible.

Through careful examination of the housing process, consideration of the limited resources available, and community-wide discussion of the Housing Plan, the St. Louis metropolitan area should join the ranks of those urban areas that have found enough courage and consensus to begin a regional housing program.

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BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS

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
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THE RIGHT WING

QUOTES BY GERALD L.K. SMITH, DIRECTOR, CHRIS-TIAN NATIONAL CRUSADE

"The enemies of America who supported McGovern are desperate, bitter, and in a vicious mood. Now that they have discovered that they cannot win the election, they are still determined to overthrow our Government and you can look for violence, bombings, campus riots, ghetto uprisings, and guerrilla assassinations. Every person who has stood out in the front fighting this treason machine is in danger physically. A Mau Mau organization has been formed all over the United States made up of militant blacks determined to assassinate people of whom they do not approve. A Jewish organization, headed by Rabbi Kahane, is pre-

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Descriptions of 129 Key Bills and Votes of the 1971 Missouri General Assembly [8-55-11] paring to exercise violence to the point of assassination against anyone who stands in the way of international Jewish intrigue....

"The desperate and frustrated traitors united as never before every negative element in American life. They were spearheaded by the treason machine which is my name for the television networks, all controlled by Jews and left wing elements. They were able to recruit the homosexuals, the lesbians, the militants, the Marxists, the oldtime Communist revolutionists, and that irresponsible libertine mass which idolizes and glorifies the whoremonger statesman (?) Teddy Kennedy. Added to these were the ignorant masses of people who call themselves the poor and abused minorities. Most of these people are not intelligent in their understanding of national problems, and they believe any demagogue who can convincingly assure them, that they are going to destroy the responsible people in America and enthrone the irresponsible.. . .

"We have just begun to fight. Soon we will file another petition calling on Mr. Nixon and his party to keep their promise to restore devotions to our school system.

'We shall serve notice without compromise that we will not stand still for a Genocide Treaty, which would make it a criminal offense for anyone to criticize a Jew, or fight mongrelization, or even oppose compulsory bussing for racial balance. This Genocide Treaty, spearheaded by the Jew from New York, Senator Jacob Javits, if it became the law of the world and the law of the land, would make it possible for left wing elements to hale our military officials, who have fought valiantly in Vietnam into an international court to be sentenced under the fine print technicalities of this Genocide Treaty. The campaign we put on to defeat this will surpass anything we have done in recent years...

"Violent elements are determined to enforce their will be chaos and confusion. There are many of our great state universities that should be closed down, because the professors of social science and the professors of economics in many of these schools are almost 100% Marxist Socialists and bureaucratic regimenters. They are mindwashing children who grew up in Christian homes into atheism, Communism and revolution.

"I pray and I ask for your prayers and your moral support. Those who have no money to give can exercise the greatest miracle made available to mankind – intercessory prayer.

MEDIA ARE TARGET OF RENEWED ATTACK

Several organizations with conservative orientations are stepping up campaigns to criticize the press and television.

"Stop Immorality on TV" is the battle cry of the Society for the Christian Commonwealth, a tax-deductible organization which centers around the Brent Bozells and is operated from Warrenton, Virginia. The Bozells, who are part of the Buckley family, have been militantly opposing liberalize of the Catholic Church for some time at the current drive, they have an advisory board of right wingers such as J. Bracken Lee, Admiral Arthur Radford, and Bob Jones.

Another group of conservatives, clustered around William F. Buckley, Jr., has started a tax-exempt foundation of Catholic laymen called *Pro Ecclesia*, *Inc.*, to "combat effectively at every possible level the incredibly 'bad press' the Church has been getting." The group is appealing for funds, partly to set up a scholarship program to "attract bright young Catholics into the media."

Its fund-raising material begins: "The Catholic Church is in trouble, and every good Catholic knows it..." It then explains that a committee "decided on immediate action in one carefully chosen area: the press." It singles out *Time, Newsweek*, and the *New York Times* and throws in ty and filthy movies for good measure.

Another group, Accuracy in Media, was organized last year by a group of hawks. It has operated with some success, chiefly by press release and letters to media, but its latest campaign zeroes in on the Federal Communications Commission. AIM disclosed in a Nov. 22 press release that it has filed suit to compel FCC to enforce the "fairness doctrine" of braodcasting a balanced presentation of public issues. The group claims that six of its complaints to the FCC have not even been answered.

A fourth group, Leadership Foundation, Inc., is run by Martha Rountree, best known as the moderator of "Meet the Press" a decade ago. Since then she has been fighting "moral pollution," organizing a claimed 36,000,000 women in her Foundation (tax exempt) and working for Richard Nixon's election.

Speaking in nearly every state of the union, Miss Rountree recruits with sharp phrases, such as calling the conditions of the U.S. "the biggest stink since the fall of the Roman Empire."

MISSOURI LIBRARIES OFFER LEGISLATIVE NEWS

A "hot line" reference service recently inaugurated, by the Missouri State Library has been expanded, now making it possible for the public to obtain up-to-date information on the status of current legislation in the Seventy-seventh General Assembly. The new free service is available to 150 public libraries throughout the state.

Using the "hot line" librarians may call directly to the State Library for immediate answers to inquiries on the status of specific legislation or series of bills, to ascertain when a bill will be introduced, or to request a copy of a particular bill, adding a new dimension to the library's reference resources.